A Dark Descent into Reality: Making the case for an objective definition of torture by Lewis, Michael W.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 1 Article 3
Winter 1-1-2010
A Dark Descent into Reality: Making the case for
an objective definition of torture
Michael W. Lewis
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael W. Lewis, A Dark Descent into Reality: Making the case for an objective definition of torture, 67
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 77 (2010), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol67/iss1/3
A Dark Descent into Reality: Making




The definition of torture is broken. The malleability of the term "severe
pain or suffering" at the heart of the definition has created a situation in which
the world agrees on the words but cannot agree on their meaning. The "V
know it when I see it" nature of the discussion of torture makes it clear that the
definition is largely left to the eye of the beholder. This is particularly
problematic when international law's reliance on self-enforcement is
considered
After discussing current misconceptions about intelligence gathering and
coercion that are common to all sides of the torture debate, this Article
describes the reality of intelligence collection. It then reviews the wide range
of competing definitions of torture: those provided by international courts,
those proposed by commentators, and those implemented by governments
around the world. Some proposed definitions are so broad that practically any
form of interrogation would be illegal, others so narrow as to allow for a wide
variety of shockingly brutal techniques.
What becomes apparent, not surprisingly, is that people or governments
under pressure from terrorist attacks view the definition of "severe pain and
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suffering" differently from those outside such a cauldron. Yet international
law's reliance upon selffenforcement requires a good faith interpretation of
malleable terms such as "severe pain and suffering" by those under such
pressure. The inevitable result, as witnessed in the United States after 9/11],in
the United Kingdom at the height of IRA violence in the early 1970s, in
Germany during the "German A utumn " battle against the RedArmy Faction in
1977, and in Israel during its struggles against Palestinian violence, is that
such a "good faith " interpretation is not readily forthcoming from those
charged with the protection of their civilian population. The excesses that
followed were generally later regretted, but such regrets do little to comfort the
victims of these excesses.
This Article proposes a solution. To prevent the definition of "severe pain
and suffering" from changing between September 10 and September 12 (or
more accurately from not being considered at all on September 10 to being
considered in a very dark light on September 12), it recommends tying the
definition to preexisting standards that are difficult to manipulate and
internally self-policing.
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All the pleasure in life is in general ideas. But all the use of life is in
specific solutions, which cannot be reached through generalities any more
than a picture can be painted by knowing some rules of method.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Letter to Elmer Gertz, March 1, 18991
I. Introduction
The definition of torture is broken. Yet in spite of tremendous interest in
the subject since 9/11, little has been done to address this problem seriously.
This is due, in part, to the preference for generalities that most scholars have, as
Holmes noted over 100 years ago. Such a preference for thinking and speaking
in generalities becomes even more pronounced when the details of a problem
are as unpleasant and gruesome as those surrounding the topic of torture. For
most authors writing about ticking time bombs, moral dilemmas, torture
1. LIvA BAKER, THE JUSTCE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLmEs 172 (199 1).
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warrants, waterboarding, criminal prosecutions, necessity defenses, and the
moral underpinnings of the rule of law, the "I know it when I see it" approach
that Justice Potter Stewart made famous when attempting to define
pornography, 2 has generally been sufficient for defining torture. While such
vague standards may be sufficient for those speaking in generalities, the recent
debate concerning possible criminal prosecutions of CIA interrogators or Bush
Administration legal advisors has highlighted the inadequacy of the current
definition in practice.3
However, there have been a few scholars deeply involved in the debate
who have understood Holmes's point and commented on the need for
something clearer, and on the difficult task involved in finding it. Sanford
Levinson closed a discussion on the torture debate by urging:
Those of us who discuss "torture," "cruel, inhuman, or degrading
activities," and "highly coercive interrogations" must climb down into the
muck and confront the "facts on the ground," rather than merely doing what
we do best, which is to proffer (and take refuge in) place-holding
abstraction. As we climb down we discover that there is far less of a
"1common conscience" than we might wish, whatever may be the degree of
our ostensible agreement on the abstract statement of the norms in
question.4
This Article will make the descent suggested by Levinson to describe the
facts on the ground. By examining the actual conduct of several states in
response to terrorist threats, this Article will demonstrate that the current
agreement on the words used to define torture belies a substantive consensus on
the conduct they prohibit. The Article will also show why choosing a clearer
and more objective definition of torture is likely to lead to better protection for
the physical integrity of detainees in many countries. It will conclude by
proposing a clear and more objective definition of torture that is designed to
increase meaningful, rather than notional, state compliance with the broadly
accepted international prohibition of torture.
Following the 9/11 attacks there were numerous questions posed about
torture. Is torture ever permissible under any circumstance? Are there different
2. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. Carrie Johnson & Joby Warrick, Bush Anti-Terror Policies Get Reluctant Revisit,
WASH. POST, July 13, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comi/wp-
dyn/content/articlef2009/07/l 2/AR200907 120211 8.html?sub--AR (discussing the debate
concerning possible criminal prosecutions of CIA interrogators and Bush Administration legal
advisors).
4. Sanford Levinson, In Quest of a "Common Conscience": Reflections on the Current
Debate About Torture, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'y 231,252 (2005) (emphasis in original).
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degrees of torture? Who has committed torture during the "War on Terror"?
What defenses might be available to someone accused of committing torture?
Much has been written in attempting to answer these questions, focusing on the
justifications for torture and going so far as to describe both the circumstances
in which it would be permissible, the procedural safeguards against "excessive
use" of "torture," and the form that such "permissible torture" might take.5
More recently there has been significant discussion concerning the
potential prosecution of former members of the Bush Administration for the
torture of detainees during interrogation. These calls for accountability focus
on the need to reestablish American credibility as a nation commnitted to
supporting international law rather than avoiding it. For those demanding such
accountability, the fact that torture has occurred is self-evident.6 Professor
Jeremy Waldron's dismissal of the need for precision in defining the offense is
illustrative: "[W]e need to remember that the charge of torture is unlikely to be
surprising or unanticipated by someone already engaging in the deliberate
infliction of pain on prisoners: 'I am shocked-shocked!-to find that
'waterboarding' . .. is regarded as torture."'0 While this statement is
rhetorically powerful, a "you should have known better" standard is probably
5. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERsHowiTz, WHY TERRORism WORKcS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 144, 156-63 (2002) (arguing for the use of "torture
warrants" to create some judicial oversight over what he views as the inevitable use of the
practice during interrogations); PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JuUiET[E N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING
LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR 31-39 (2005) (proposing that specific techniques of "highly
coercive interrogations" that are short of torture be authorized under limited circumstances
involving "emergency exceptions" approved by the President); Miriam Gur-Arye, Can the War
Against Terror Just ify the Use of Force in Interrogations?, in TORTuRE: A COLLECTION 183,
195 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (recharacterizing the Israeli defense of "necessity" as "self-
defense" and stating that force should only be permitted in interrogations in the narrowest of
"ticking time bomb" scenarios); see also Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 CoLum. L. R.Ev. 1681, 171 4-i15 (2005) (rejecting the
use of "ticking time bomb" scenarios in the torture debate as strawmen to allow the
contemplation of acts otherwise unthinkable).
6. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, The Effects of Obama 's Refusal to Investigate Bush
Crimes, Jan. 20,2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/01/20/turley/ index.htmlA
(last visited Feb. 22, 20 10) (quoting Jonathan Turley of George Washington University College
of Law as stating that "[t]hese are war crimes" and comparing George Bush to Augusto
Pinochet) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Nat Hentoff, Considering the
War-Crimes Trial of the Bush Administration, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.villagevoice.comI
content/printVersionl658475 (last visited Feb. 22, 20 10) (quoting Dean Lawrence Velvel of the
Massachusetts School of Law as saying that "[w]e've already seen how the torture president has
exercised his 'inherent unitary-executive constitutional authority"' at a conference organized by
Velvel to plan for war-crimes trials of the Bush Administration) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
7. Waldron, supra note 5, at 1700.
1
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not a sufficient basis for bringing criminal charges. At a minimum, a defendant
so charged might be forgiven a certain degree of incredulity at being criminally
charged for waterboarding a detainee if he had performed the exact same act on
numerous American service members both before and after the interrogation of
the detainee.8 This begs the question: What exactly is torture and how should
its boundaries be legally defined?
II. Universal Condemnation, Practical Uncertainties
Torture is a universally condemned practice. It is a violation of both
positive9 and natural law'0 and yet it is undoubtedly practiced by both states and
private individuals with some frequency.'" There is near universal agreement
that torture is not merely wrong, but evil, and there is a generally agreed upon
definition for the term that prohibits the intentional infliction of "severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental." 12  However, there is very little
consensus on what that definition actually means. Those scholars that have
addressed this question are hopelessly divided. Some have remarked on the
fact that "[tlorture does not have a clear legal meaning, in part because there
8. Waterboarding was a standard training technique used by the U.S. military in its
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) courses that all special forces and combat
aviators went through. As a graduate of SERE training in the early 1 990s, I can personally
confirm that waterboarding was used at that time. See 153 CONG. REc. S 14147, 14148 (2007)
(statement of Sen. Durbin) (quoting testimony of Malcohn Nance, a former SERE instructor,
speaking of training Navy SEALs to resist torture: "I know the waterboard personally and
intimately.... I personally led, witnessed and supervised waterboarding of hundreds of
people").
9. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/45/Annex (Dec. 10, 1984)
[hereinafter CAT].
10. Along with genocide and piracy, torture is recognized as a prototypical jus cogens
violation. Torture was clearly established as a violation of the law of nations before the CAT
was created. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Having
examined the sources from which customary international law is derived the usage of nations,
judicial opinions and the works ofjurists we conclude that official torture is now prohibited by
the law of nations."). Since the creation of the CAT, torture has been consistently viewed as a
violation of the law of nations.
11. See Ariel Dorfmnan, The Tyranny of Terror.: Is Torture Inevitable in Our Century and
Beyond?, in TORTuRE: A COLLECTION, supra note 5, at 3, 5 (stating that, at last count, there are
132 countries around the world in which torture is contemplated as inevitable).
12. See CAT, supra note 9, art. 1 ("For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'torture'
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession.")
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have been no general and systematic attempts to map the border between
'torture' and 'not torture.'"'13 Similarly, the recently released Office of Legal
Counsel memoranda on the CIA interrogation techniques qualified their
analysis by stating that the task of interpreting and applying the prohibition of
severe pain and suffering is complicated by the "imprecision in the statutory
standard and the relative lack of guidance in the case law." 14 Others that have
chosen to, or in some cases been required to, "map the border between torture
and not torture" have produced widely varying answers, be they commentators,
legislators, or members of the executive branch after 9/11.15 The resulting
definitions range from very narrow interpretations of what constitutes torture
that would permit the intentional infliction of substantial pain,1 to expansive
definitions that would practically outlaw interrogations of any kind. 17 Still
others argue that any attempt to define torture clearly is counterproductive and
should not be attempted because it encourages behavior that necessarily
approaches whatever line is drawn.'18 Whatever their positions on the definition
of torture, those that have attempted to define it usually have done so as a way
13. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the "War on Terrorism", 1 J. NAT'L
SEC. L. & POL'Y 285, 289 (2005) (noting that the overlapping prohibitions of "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment" and "torture" found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights, have blurred the distinction
between these two acts); cf. Nigel S. Rodley, The Definition(s) of Torture in InternationalLaw,
in 55 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS. 467, 468-89 (Michael Freeman ed., 2002) (providing a
painstaking review of treaty and case law establishing the development of the definition of
torture with a particular focus on the standards used by the European Court of Human Rights).
14. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., to
John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (May 10, 2005)
[hereinafter Bradbury Memo] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), [hereinafter Bybee Memo] ("We [Office of
the Assistant Att'y Gen.] further conclude that certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading,
but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A's
[ 18 U.S.C. § § 2340-2340A] proscription against torture.") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); John T. Parry, What is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are?, 64
U. Prr-r. L. Rnv. 237, 260-61 (2003) (arguing coercive interrogation must be a last resort and
describing how the dynamic of custodial interrogations easily crosses the line into torture).
16. See Bybee Memo, supra note 15, at 6 (concluding that the word torture and the
prohibition on torture should be reserved only for the infliction of the sort of extreme pain that
would be associated with death or organ failure).
17. See Parry, supra note 15, at 249 (arguing that torture is also the infliction of
potentially escalating pain for purposes that include dominating the victim and seeking to make
the victim responsible for the pain incurred).
18. See Waldron, supra note 5, at 1715 ("And [torture] is corrupt because it attempts to
use a farfetched scenario, more at home in a television thriller than in the real world,
deliberately to undermine the integrity of certain moral positions.").
3
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of furthering other goals. Whether those goals were protecting individual
rights, maintaining moral standards of conduct, or protecting national security,
the debate has devolved into a struggle to determine who will be the "master of
the language" that is used. 19 Although, as Levinson points out, it may have
been acceptable for Humpty Dumpty to assert that "when I use a word, it means
just what I choose it to mean,"00 there is something seriously wrong when
commentators, legislators, and executives take such an approach toward
defining something as important as torture.'
What is made apparent by this struggle to even speak the same language,
much less reach consensus, is that the subjectivity inherent in the cur-rent
definition of torture is a fatal flaw.2 An examination of the state practices of
Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom when faced with terrorist threats, as
well as our own reaction to 9/11, demonstrates that even liberal democracies
have used the subjectivity inherent in the term "severe pain or suffering" to
permit interrogations and detention techniques that have later been criticized as
23torture. This Article proposes a first step toward solving this problem by
providing a clear definition of "severe pain or suffering" based upon a morally
defensible objective standard that is internally self-policing and difficult to
manipulate.
Critical to fashioning this proposal is the acknowledgment of its
limitations. Because it recognizes that its impact will be limited to states that
are willing to be influenced by human rights treaties, this Article carefully
examines the question of how the definition of torture can be fashioned to
increase compliance by willing states. Such a "modest" goal that concedes
from the outset that there are states that are not influenced by human rights
treaties, even though they have officially acceded to those treaties, might seem
like an embrace of a legal realist view of international law and a repudiation of
19. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 236 ("in many ways, the best way of understanding the
contemporary debate about torture is as a fundamental struggle over who will get to be the
,master' of the language we use when giving concrete definition to 'torture."').
20. Id.
21. See Waldron, supra note 5, at 1716 (arguing that there will always be some depraved
individuals who act in a way that is simply abusive).
22. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, US. Decries Abuse But Defends
Interrogations; 'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret
Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A01 (discussing concerns with the
definition of torture where officials maintain that "stress and duress" techniques are unpleasant
but fall short of torture).
23. See Waldron, supra note 5, at 1684 ("The use of torture has in recent decades
disfigured the security policies of... Britain (in Northern Ireland), Israel (in the Occupied
Territories), and now the United States (in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba).").
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natural law idealism.24 This is not the case. Instead, it is based on the belief,
supported by Professor Qona Hathaway's empirical work on the effectiveness
of international law, that "domestic enforcement of international law is essential
to compliance."2 5 Domestic enforcement, or perhaps more accurately "self-
enforcement," of international legal obligations is critical for compliance where
transnational legal enforcement mechanisms are weakest.26 If this is true, and
the available empirical evidence on the effectiveness of international law
strongly suggests that it is, then the question "how should torture be legally
defined?" is insufficient. Instead, the question must become "how can the
definition of torture be fashioned to improve the incentives for self-
enforcement?"
The answer is to tie the definition of "severe pain or suffering" to
preexisting and well-documented limitations on the stresses that may be
imposed on a nation's own trainees. Simply put, a detaining state may not do
unto its detainees that which it does not regularly do to its own trainees.
Part Im of this Article will examine the use of coercive interrogation in
intelligence collection. It will dispel often referenced misconceptions about the
intelligence gathering process that often prevent serious debate about where
and how lines defining torture should be drawn. Discussions of "ticking time
bomb" scenarios generally lead to the conclusion that there are some situations
in which we "must do what we have to do" no matter where the lines are drawn.
Similarly, the argument that "coercion does not work because it only produces
unreliable information" leads to the conclusion that there is no value at all in
the use of any coercion, so line-drawing is unnecessary. Part III also will
discuss the realities of intelligence collection to show the very narrow area in
which the coercion question arises, and it will explain why there remain
situations in which coercive techniques are still regarded as being effective.
24. Compare JACK L. GoLDSMITH & Eluc A. POSNER, THE LimaTs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
25 (2005) ("[Traditional theory] does not explain why states sometimes say they will abide by
particular customary international laws and then violate their promise."), with MARY ELLEN
O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (2008) (arguing in favor of a
legal process theory to address the concern of whether international law has power in the
international community).
25. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. Cmn. L. REv. 469, 520 (2005) ("The integrated theory presented here
makes clear that strong domestic institutions are essential not only to domestic rule of law, hut
also to international rule of law.").
26. See id. (describing the primacy of self-enforcement to support compliance with
treaties in which transnational legal enforcement mechanisms are very weak); see also Oona A.
Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the International Law of Torture, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra note 5, at 205-08 (discussing the importance of self-enforcement for
compliance with the Convention Against Torture).
5
86 7 WASH. & LEE L. REV 77 (2010)
Part IV will describe the current prohibitions against torture found in
international law and specifically the provisions of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT). It will examine interpretations of this prohibition, ranging from the
very restrictive to the highly expansive, and it will review court decisions that
have addressed what specific acts constitute torture and consider how the
related prohibition against the use of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
impacts how torture is viewed. Part V will examine the detention and
interrogation measures taken by a variety of nations in response to terror
threats, illustrating why a subjective definition of torture cannot be effective in
constraining state behavior within the current system of international law. Part
VI will describe the objective definition that is being proposed and will discuss
benefits that its adoption will produce. The Article will conclude by attempting
to answer anticipated criticisms of the proposed definition.
III. Coercion in Intelligence Collection
A. Intelligence Collection Myths
Both sides of the torture debate typically employ oversimplified and
inaccurate characterizations of the role interrogations play in the intelligence
gathering process. To address properly the issue of how coercive interrogations
should be limited, it is first necessary to expose the flaws in some commonly
repeated lines of argument. In particular, discussions of ticking time bomb
scenarios and use of the familiar claim that "torture does not work" because it
produces bad information do little to advance the serious consideration of the
issue at hand. While both lines of argument contain a kernel of truth, their use
displays a complete lack of understanding of how intelligence actually is
gathered. But because they are both so deeply ingrained in almost any
discussion about coercion or torture, it is useful to dispense with them before
further discussing coercive interrogations.
1. Ticking Time Bombs
The ticking time bomb scenario is seductively appealing in its simplicity.
A bomb is planted in a large metropolitan area threatening hundreds--or in the
nuclear variant, even hundreds of thousands-of innocent lives. The state has
custody of an individual who knows where the bomb is, or how it may be
disabled, but that individual will not talk. Surely saving the lives of thousands
86
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justifies inflicting even the most egregious pain on one person, or even a
handful of people.2 While some have eloquently refused to be seduced by
such logic, 28 others, even from a part of the political spectrum not usually
sympathetic to things like harsh interrogation or torture, including Senator
Charles Schumer29 and Leon Panetta, 30 have mentioned ticking time bombs in
their discussions of when harsher interrogation methods or torture might be
used.
Although there certainly are examples of real world ticking time bomb
scenarios in which coercion or torture resulted in lives being saved,3 these
incidents are extremely rare, no matter what 24 and Jack Bauer may imply.
The infrequency of such occurrences and the lack of certainty about the harms
or the immediacy involved even in these rare instances make the ticking time
bomb scenario a grossly overused point of discussion.
Several scholars have quite ably exposed the flaws of considering the
ticking time bomb hypothetical when debating the use of coercion or torture in
interrogations.3 Their criticism focuses on the unrealistic assumptions that
27. See, e.g., David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv.
1425, 1440 (2005) ("[Wie shouldn't be too squeamish to torture the information out of him and
save hundreds of lives [in a ticking bomb situation]."); see also Henry Shue, Torture, in
TORTuRE: A COLLECTION, supra note 5, at 47, 57 (arguing if a nuclear device is going to
explode in Paris, then torture is appropriate because in extraordinary cases the benefits of pure
interrogational torture would greatly outweigh the cruelty of the torture itself); Scheppele, supra
note 13, at 285-86 ("Of course [in a ticking bomb situation], you would torture. Only those
completely indifferent to grotesquely bad consequences would not.").
28. See Dorfinan, supra note 11, at 17 ("1 can only pray that humanity will have the
courage to say no, no to torture, no to torture under any circumstance whatsoever .... 1)
29. See DOJ Oversight: Terrorism and Other Topics: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary) (rejecting the idea "that torture should never ever be used" when confronted by a
ticking time bomb scenario).
30. See Mark Mazzetti, Panetta Open to Tougher Methods in Some CIA. Interrogation,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A14 ("'If we had a ticking bomb situation, and obviously, whatever
was being used I felt was not sufficient, I would not hesitate to go to the president of the United
States and request whatever additional authority I would need."' (quoting Leon Panetta,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency)).
31. See Luban, supra note 27, at 1441-42 (discussing a foiled plot to assassinate the Pope
and the aI-Qaeda Pacific airliner plot).
32. See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 13, at 293-95, 305-06 ("1 will argue, the pitched
debate over [the ticking time bomb] hypothetical and its logical entailments obscures rather than
identifies what the real choices are in the present situation."); Luban, supra note 27, at 1442
("The ticking-bomb scenario cheats its way around these difficulties by stipulating that the
bomb is there, ticking away, and that officials know it and know they have the man who planted
it. Those conditions will seldom be met."); Shue, supra note 27, at 58 ("The distance between
the situations which must be concocted in order to have a plausible case of morally permissible
torture and the situations which actually occur is, if anything, further reason why the existing
7
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underlie the hypothetical. None of the certainties that exist in the hypothetical
are found in the real world. Interrogators rarely, if ever, will know the
magnitude of the threat or its imminence for certain. It is also unlikely that the
interrogators will know with certainty that the suspect they are interrogating
actually has the information necessary to avert the disaster. Nor is it certain
that resorting to torture will yield the information desired. 3 Finally, as Kim
Lane Scheppele points out, the hypothetical also avoids the complex difficulties
with which this Article is grappling, by posing the question as an individual
moral choice, not the rationale for a bureaucracy creating regulations that allow
for torture in certain situations.3
These commentators conclude that the ticking time bomb scenario is used
as a canard by those that want to justify torture by making even the most
reprehensible practices seem rational. Whether or not discussion of these
scenarios is done for the purpose of intentionally misrepresenting or
oversimplifying the choices involved, it is clear that any serious consideration
of coercive interrogation techniques must go well beyond this popular, but
unrealistic, scenario.
2. "Torture Does Not Work"
Another commonly used oversimplification in the torture debate is one
that attempts to eliminate the need for any debate at all by negating any possible
justification for coercion. This simplification states that torture does not work
because it elicits unreliable information. Given the general agreement that
exists, at least among states that are willing to be influenced by the definition of
torture, that torture as punishment or torture to extract confessions is always
wrong, the only context in which it might be permissible would be in the
prohibitions against torture should remain and should be strengthened by making torture an
international crime.").
33. See Waldron, supra note 5, at 1715 ("It is silly because torture is seldom used in the
real world to elicit startling facts about particular ticking bombs; it is used by American
interrogators and others to accumulate lots of small pieces of relatively insignificant
infomation....)
34. See Scheppele, supra note 13, at 305 ("The hypothetical assumes that the interrogator
is making an individual decision as an independent moral agent. But in reality, the interrogator
is following rules about when torture may be permitted-rules of a bureaucracy in which the
interrogator is in a subordinate position, following established procedures."); Luban, supra note
27. at 1445-50 ("[A]ny responsible discussion of torture must address the practice of torture,
not the ticking-bomb hypothetical.").
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interrogational setting.3 If, in fact, it is unreliable as an interrogational tool,
then there can be no justification for coercion whatsoever.
Like the ticking time bomb scenario, this line of argument also contains
some truth. There is strong evidence that the most effective way to exploit an
intelligence source over an extended period of time is usually through rapport-
building and patient, noncoercive interrogations. 36 However, acceptance of the
premise that noncoercive interrogations generally are superior in the long-termi
exploitation of an intelligence source does not negate the claim that coercive
methods can produce results in time-critical or high-value situations.3
The claim that coercion is not a valuable interrogational tool is made by a
variety of people for a variety of reasons. Not surprisingly, some commentators
that are most critical of the ticking time bomb scenario, and those generally
opposed to any form of coercion, embrace the "torture does not work"
oversimplification as further support for their position that no possible
justification for coercion exists.3 But the warning that coercion yields
unreliable results also is employed tactically by the military as a training tool
that reinforces compliance with the Geneva Conventions by its interrogators.3
35. See Shue, supra note 27, at 53 (discussing at length the different reasons for torture).
36. See Randy Borumn, Approaching Truth: Behavioral Science Lessons on Educing
Informnation from Human Sources, in EDUCING INFORMATION: INTERROGATION: SCIENCE AND
ART-FOUNDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE BOARD, PHASE 1 REPORT 17,17-
37 (Russell Swenson ed., 2006) ("[Slocial science research on persuasion and interpersonal
influence could provide a foundation for a more effective approach to educing information in
intelligence-gathering contexts.").
37. See Greg Miller, Departing CIA Chief Defends Interrogations, L.A. TuIMEs, Jan. 16,
2009, at A14, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/Jan/l16/nation/na-cial 6 ("'These
[enhanced interrogation] techniques worked.... Do not allow others to say it didn't work....
It worked."' (quoting former CIA Director General Michael Hayden)).
38. See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 13, at 335-37 (describing several sources, including a
1 960s-era CIA manual, that assert that coercive interrogation techniques do not produce reliable
information); All Things Considered: Holder Calls Waterboarding Torture (NPR radio
broadcast Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/stoiy/story.php?
storyld=99404524 (explaining his position that torture does not work, Attorney General Eric
Holder said that "[pleople will say almost anything to avoid torture"); Demns Slam Bush Veto on
Waterboarding Ban, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 8, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2008-03-08-bushaddressN.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 20 10) ("'On the other hand, I
do know that coercive interrogations can lead detainees to provide false information in order to
make the interrogation stop. "' (quoting Senator Jay Rockefeller, Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence)) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. See CHARIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS: INSIDE THE SECRET WAR
AGAINST AL-QAEDA 31-32 (2004) (relating stories from instructors in U.S. Army interrogator
training programs about torture of prisoners by South Vietnamese forces that elicited false
information).
9
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Although the "ticking time bomb scenario," much like the "torture does
not work" line of argument, has a large number of adherents from across the
political and policy making spectrum, it does not stand up well to reality. There
are many examples of torture, or at least highly coercive interrogation
techniques, foiling terrorist plots and saving the lives of civilians or soldiers.
Some of these examples are well documented, such as the torture used by
Filipino police in disrupting a 1995 al-Qaeda plot to simultaneously blow up
eleven U.S. airliners over the Pacific. 40 Other examples of coercion being
effective are impossible to assess fully until the interrogations are declassified.
These examples include the Israeli claim that its security service had foiled
ninety planned terrorist attacks-including suicide bombings, car bombings,
kidnappings, and murders-based upon information gained through the use of
coercive interrogations.' Similarly, former CIA operations officer John
Kiriakou and others claim that waterboarding Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
Sheikh Mohammad yielded information that led to major intelligence
breakthroughs that disrupted "a number of attacks, maybe dozens of attacks."'42
Even though some of these claims cannot be fully corroborated yet, it is clear
that coercive interrogation techniques are effective at quickly eliciting
information, a portion of which has real intelligence value.
B. Actual Intelligence Collection
Intelligence collection typically is a long, tedious process that involves
gathering countless fragments of information and gradually piecing them
together to form an overall picture.4 These fragments can be scraps of paper
40. See Luban, supra note 27, at 1441-42 (describing how a Pakistani bomb-maker
confessed after weeks of torture by "agents [that] hit him with a chair and a long piece of wood,
forced water into his mouth, and crushed lighted cigarettes into his private parts").
41. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture [CAT], Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Second Periodic Reports of States Parties
Due in 1996: Add.: Isr., T 24, U.N. Doc. CATIC/33/Add.2/Rev.1I (Feb. 17, 1997) ("Among
these planned attacks are some 10 suicide bombings; 7 car-bombings; 15 kidnappings of
soldiers and civilians; and some 60 attacks of different types including shootings of soldiers and
civilians, hijacking of buses, stabbing and murder of Israelis, placing of explosives, etc.").
42. See ABC News: Interview by Brian Ross with John Kiriakou: CIA-Abu Zubaydah
17-18, 39 (ABC television broadcast Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://abcnews.go.
com/images/Blotter/brianross kiriakou transcript 1 blotter07 121 I0.pdf [hereinafter Kiriakou
Interview] (stating that accused terroristAbu Zubaydah began cooperating with interrogators
after being waterboarded for thirty-five seconds).
43. See MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 39, at 71-451 (chronicling the experiences of five
U.S. interrogators at Afghan military prisons). Some of the understanding of intelligence
collection contained in this section also is based on the author's seven years of personal
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found in the pocket of a captured enemy, a consistent phrase used by a number
of prisoners, or an inconsistent remark made by one. They may be files found
on the hard drive of a captured laptop, an intercepted cell phone call, or the
nervous glance of a prisoner in response to a pointed question. There is good
information, bad information, and a great deal of noninformation that is
gathered from the tens of thousands of interrogation sessions that take place
during a conflict. There are places that act as safe houses or weapons stores
that can be physically verified. There are descriptions of internal
communications procedures, decisionmiaking; processes, and command
structures that are cross-referenced against similar descriptions provided by
other prisoners. And there are opinions and observations about individuals'
personalities and motivations that provide valuable insight, but are practically
impossible to verify independently. The veracity of this last type of information
is judged by the demeanor of a prisoner when giving the information. Almost
all prisoners tell the truth at least part of the time, and almost all prisoners lie at
least part of the time. While research on detecting deception seems to provide
little support for any reliable nonverbal indicators of deception, it also concedes
that most of the studies are conducted in a laboratory setting using very short
interviews."4 Some degree of confidence can be established in the ability to
detect deception in some prisoners by interviewing the same prisoner on
numerous separate occasions for hours at a time and carefully noting when and
how the subject behaves when he is giving information that has been verified as
true and when he gives information that has been verified as false.4
Like any other aspect of warfare, intelligence collection is characterized by
continual innovation and adaptation of tactics and techniques. Once one side
understands how its people will be interrogated, it is able to prepare them to
resist that sort of interrogation. When the interrogators learn which resistance
techniques their opponents are using, they will modify their interrogational
approach. The ebb and flow of technique and counter-technique is constant
and readily apparent to those that are involved in the process. One interrogator
in Afghanistan remarked: "It was strange to see a prisoner trying [resistance]
experience in the U.S. Navy and the author's father's thirty-five years as an intelligence analyst
for the National Security Agency.
44. See Gary Hazlett, Research on Detection of Deception. What We Know vs. What We
Think We Know, in EDUCING INFORMATION: INTERROGATION: SCIENCE AND ART-FOUNDATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE, INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 36, at 45, 45-61 (suggesting
improvements in deception detection research, including studying the target population, using
larger sample sizes and longer interrogations, and investigating cultural differences).
45. See MACKEY & MILLER, supra note 39, at 123-29, 132-38 (describing the narrator's
repeated interrogation sessions with Prisoner 140 and how, over time, he learned to recognize
physical cues that indicated when the prisoner was lying).
1
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techniques that we hadn't encountered in months. We thought perhaps he had
been on the run and isolated from the fleeing Arab scene in Pakistan's cities,
where more sophisticated resistance techniques were being devised and spread
by word of mouth.",46
The fundamental goal of any interrogator is to keep the prisoner off
balance, confused, disoriented, and, at times, afraid.4 This fear need not be of
physical harm. It may be fear of betrayal by one's comrades, fear of prolonged
separation from family, fear that a prior interrogation session provided valuable
information to the enemy, or simply fear of the unknown.4 While interrogators
try to prolong this fear, confusion, and disorientation, it is a difficult task. As
Chris Mackey, an Army interrogator in Afghanistan, said, "Fear is often an
interrogator's best ally, but it doesn't have a long shelf life."4
The American experience in Afghanistan illustrates why this is so and why
interrogators find employing some form of coercion useful. In Afghanistan,
one of the reasons that fear did not have a long shelf life was that the al-Qaeda
prisoners had been told what to expect when they were captured. A captured
al-Qaeda training manual gave the following instructions on resisting
interrogation:
Hold out on providing any information for at least twenty-four hours, it
said, to give "brothers" enough time to adjust their plans. The Americans
"1will not harm you physically," the manual said, but "they must be tempted
into doing so. And if they do strike a brother, you must complain to the
authorities immediately." It added that the baiting of Americans should be
sufficient to result in an attack that leaves "evidence." You could end the
career of an interrogator, maybe even prompt an international outcry, if you
could show the Red Cross a bruise or a scar.5
Once the prisoners had been held for a couple of days and had learned that this
description of their captivity was accurate, that they would be well fed, and that
there were no adverse physical consequences for lying or refusing to answer
questions, any fear of the unknown rapidly vanished."'
46. Id. at3l10.
47. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANuAL No. 2-22.3, HumAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATioNs 8.21 (2006) ("[Prisoners] tend to be disoriented and exhibit high
degrees of fear and anxiety. This vulnerable state fades over time, and it is vital for [human
intelligence] collectors to interrogate EPWs [enemy prisoners of war] as soon as and as close to
the point of capture as possible.").
48. See id. at 479-83 (listing the various techniques employed by Army interrogators,
found in the Army Field Manual (FM 34-52)).
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. at 179.
51. See id. at 181 (speculating that the regularity and routine of life in U.S. Army captivity
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The interrogations in Afghanistan were limited to the techniques found in
the Army Field Manual, and as the cat-and-mouse game between the al-Qaeda
prisoners and interrogators continued, there was a sense that these limitations
restricted the effectiveness of the interrogations. "Our experience in
Afghanistan showed that the harsher the methods we used-though they never
contravened the Conventions, let alone crossed over into torture-the better the
information we got and the sooner we got it. "'
2
It should be remembered that Mackey's assurance that interrogations
"never crossed over into torture" was based upon his subjective understanding
of the definition of torture. Even if Mackey's group never crossed such a line,
there is a widespread belief that others at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib did. 
53
As we turn to the variety of definitions of torture both employed and proposed,
it becomes clear that there are those who claim that some of the techniques that
Mackey employed were torture, while others go so far as to justify the conduct
at Abu Ghraib. Arriving at a definition that closes this gap by dealing with the
specifics of how torture should be defined will be critical to the future of
intelligence gathering.
IV Prohibitions Against Torture
A. The International Prohibition of Torture
There can be no question that international law prohibits torture .54 It is
well established that customary international law prohibits torture and views its
use as ajus cogens violation. In his opinion in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, Judge
Kaufman canvasses numerous conventions and commentators and finds that
they all come to the same conclusion: The law of nations prohibits official
torture. 5 Not only is this prohibition clearly established in customary
weakened the ability to interrogate effectively).
52. Id. at 477.
53. See Mark Danner, Tales from Torture's Dark World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,2009, at
WIKl3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/opinion/15danner.html (detailing the
leaked reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross on the mistreatment of the
'high value" detainees at Guantanamo).
54. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The prohibition is
clear and unabiguous. .. ."); see also Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-1711,
Judgment, 1111 (July 21, 2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refwvorld/pdfid/402768
fc4.pdf ("[T]here is now general acceptance of the main elements contained in the definition set
out in Article I of the Torture Convention, and. ... the definition given in Article 1 reflects
customary international law.").
55. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-85 ("Having examined the sources from which
3
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international law, but it also is a positive obligation on all the signatories of
several widely accepted international treaties and conventions. Most notably,
each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949-the only international treaties to
ever achieve universal acceptance-prohibits torture.f6 Common Article 3 of
these Conventions (so named because each of the four conventions contains the
identical article) prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.",57  Likewise, Additional
Protocol 11 of 1977, which supplements Common Article 3, reiterates the
prohibition on torture and includes a list of other prohibited actions such as
rape, pillage, slavery, the takcing of hostages, and collective punishments .
58
Although the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols only
apply in times of armed conflict, human rights conventions-both aspirational
and binding-also clearly prohibit torture in all circumstances. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, a nonbinding U.N. General Assembly Resolution
passed in 1948, provides that " [n]o one shall be subj ected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."5 9 The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) used the same language in its binding
prohibition of torture in 1966 .60 The identical language also is found in
customary international law is derived-the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of
jurists-we conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations.").
56. See Press Release, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, A Milestone for International
Humanitarian Law (Sept. 22,2006), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng.nsf/htmi geneva-
conventions-statement-220906 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (noting that, with the 2006 decisions
of Nauru and Montenegro to accede to the Geneva Conventions, all 194 of the world's countries
have accepted the treaty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
57. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, 1(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, 32; Geneva Convention (11) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, 1(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 88; Geneva Convention (11H) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 3, 1(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138; Geneva
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, 1 (a),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 290.
58. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11) art. 4,1 2, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 11] ("All persons who do not
take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has
been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious
practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely. .. .)
59. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5, G.A. Res. 21 7A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1 st plen. mtg., UN Doc. A/8 10 (Dec. 10, 1948).
60. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, G.A. Res. 2200A, at
53, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR] ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
94
A DARK DESCENT INTO REALITY 9
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and nearly identical
language, merely transposing the words "punishment" and "treatment," is found
in the American Convention on Human Rights.6 ' Although these and other
conventions all clearly prohibit the practice, none of them attempt to define
further either torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.
For a more definitive explanation of the ternm, we must turn to the CAT.
Article 1 of the CAT defines torture as:
[Amny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
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There is widespread acceptance of this definition, indicated by the fact that
there are 146 state parties to the Convention.6 However, this consensus on the
wording of the Convention misleadingly implies agreement on the actual scope
of the prohibition, which is not borne out in practice.
B. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment (CID)
One factor that blurs the practical definition of torture is its pairing with
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (CID).64 Many of the
punishment.").
61. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 005 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); American Convention on Human Rights art.
5,1 2, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 146 ("No one shall be subjected to torture orto cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.").
62. CAT, supra note 9, art. 1, 11.
63. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1-3, available at http://treaties.un.org/
doc/PublicationlMTDSGNolume%/2IIChapter/2OIVIIV-9.en.pdf (listing the Convention
Against Torture's 146 parties and seventy-six signatories).
64. See Scheppele, supra note 13, at 289 ("Torture does not have a clear legal meaning, in
part because there have been no general and systematic attempts to map the border between
'torture' and 'not torture."); see also Levinson, supra note 4, at 238-40 ("1 think it is especially
important to differentiate between 'degrading treatment' and 'torture,' lest one end up
trivializing the concept of torture and diminishing the special horror attached to that term.").
5
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Conventions that prohibit torture also prohibit CID. 6 ' However, a split has
developed over whether these conventions recognize any legal distinction
between the two forms of treatment. On the one hand, the ICCPR, the
European Convention on Human Rights, and the American Convention on
Human Rights all prohibit both torture and CID, and also state that no
derogation may be made from either of these provisions in time of emergency.6
For these conventions, both types of conduct are equally impermissible. In
contrast, the CAT separates its prohibition against torture, found in Articles 2,
3, and 4, from its prohibition of "acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment," found in Article 16.6 It goes on to specify that torture and
CID are not coextensive, stating that CID is defined as those acts "which do not
amount to torture as defined in article l.",68 Article 16 further differentiates
CID from torture by selectively applying some articles of the convention to the
prevention of CID, while leaving others applicable only to allegations of
69
torture. More importantly, Article 2(2) of the CAT provides that the
65. See CAT, supra note 9, art. 16, 1 ("Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in
any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1 . .. ."); ICCPR, supra note
60, art. 7 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 61, art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6 1,
art. 5, 2 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment
or treatment.").
66. See ICCPR, supra note 60, art. 4, 2 ("No derogation from articles 6,7,8 (paragraphs
1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision."); European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 6 1, art. 15, 2 ("No
derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawfuil acts of war, or from
Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision."); American Convention
on Human Rights, supra note 6 1, art. 27, 2 ("The foregoing provision does not authorize any
suspension of the following articles: . . . Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment) .. . or of the
judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.").
67. Compare CAT, supra note 9, art. 2, I ("Each State Party shall take effective
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction."), id. art. 3, 1 ("No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture."), and id. art. 4 ("Each State Party shall ensure
that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law."), with id. art. 16,$ 1 (requiring states
to prevent "other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture as defined in article I" when the state is complicit in such acts).
68. CAT, supra note 9, art. 16, T 1.
69. See id. art. 16, 1 ("In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and
13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture or references to other forms of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); see also id. arts. 10-13 (addressing the
prevention of both CID and torture, while all articles of the CAT apply to situations involving
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prohibition on torture is nonderogable, even in time of war or state emergency,
while similar status is not afforded the prohibition against CID.7
The CAT is the most recent of these Conventions, and it more specifically
addresses questions of torture and CID than do the broader ICCPR and human
rights conventions. These general principles of statutory interpretation would
seem to favor deference to the distinction that CAT establishes between torture
and CID. This distinction is further supported by the fact that a number of
European Court of Human Rights cases dealing with claims of torture and CID,
including the seminal case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 7' have distinguished
between torture and CID in their rulings.7 However, since 9/11, specific
efforts have been made, at least by the Council of Europe, to confirm the
absolute and nonderogable prohibition of both torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment.7 There also have been medical studies that have
indicated that the distinction between torture and CID is not particularly
meaningful when the long term outcome of the victims is considered.7
Arguments can be made on either side of the debate as to whether the
definition of torture has been made irrelevant by the expansion of the absolute
torture).
70. See id. art. 2, 2 ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war
or a threat or war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as
ajustification of torture."); see also Levinson, supra note 4, at 239-40 ("Why did the drafters
not simply copy the provision of the earlier International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which established a non-derogable requirement that 'no one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment'?").
71. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (considering whether five
techniques used by the UK government on suspected IRA terrorists constituted torture).
72. See id. at 66 ("[lt was the intention that the Convention, with its distinction between
'torture' and 'inhuman or degrading treatment,' should by the first of these terms attach a
special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering."); see
also Aydin v. Turkey, 1 997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866, 1945-46 ("This distinction would appear to
have been embodied in the Convention to allow the special stigma of 'torture' to attach only to
deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering.").
73. See COMM. OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF Euit., GUIDELINES ON HumAN RIGHTS
AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 7, 21 (2002), available at http://www.coe.int/T7/
E/Human -rightsh-inf(2002)8eng.pdf (stating that the "use of torture or of inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, is absolutely prohibited"); see id. at 12 ("States may
never ... derogate. ... from the prohibition against torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.").
74. See Metin Basoglu, Maria Livanou & Cvetana Crnobaric, Torture vs. Other Cruel,
Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment. Is the Distinction Real or Apparent?, 64 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 277, 284 (2007) [hereinafter Mental Torture] ("[A]ggressive interrogation
techniques ... and other psychological manipulations conducive to anxiety, fear, and
helplessness in the detainee do not seem to be substantially different from physical torture in
term of... their long-term traumatic effects.").
7
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prohibition to the much broader category of CID. I note this impasse mainly to
prevent it from being used to undermine the purpose of this Article. While I
am persuaded by Levinson's arguments that there is value in continuing to
differentiate between torture and CID,75 others will not be .76 This Article will
not try to persuade in either direction on that question. To the extent that
torture is considered to be legally distinct from CID, this Article seeks only to
define the boundaries of torture. To the extent that CID is viewed as the legal
equivalent of torture in all respects, this Article's proposal will define the
boundaries of the broader category of CID.
C. Court Decisions
The European Court of Human Rights has been by far the most active
judicial body in deciding cases related to claims of torture in the context of
coercive interrogations. Given the vague definition, it is not surprising that the
jurisprudence is somewhat unclear as to where exactly the lines are to be
drawn. 7
7
In the leading case of Ireland v. UnitedKingdom, 78 decided by the court in
1978, the Government of the Republic of Ireland complained, inter alia, that
the techniques used by the authorities of the United Kingdom to interrogate
suspected members of the IRA violated Article 3 of the European Convention
of Human Rights .79 These complaints involved approximately 228 cases of
alleged abuse.80 Of these, the European Commission on Human Rights
examined sixteen "illustrative" cases in detail and considered medical reports
75. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 238 ("1 think it is especially important to differentiate
between 'degrading treatment' and 'torture,' lest one end up trivializing the concept of torture
and diminishing the special horror attached to that term.").
76. See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 13, at 290 ("The U.S. torture statute, then,
undermined an apparently solid consensus in international law condemning highly coercive
interrogation, regardless of whether the interrogation methods amounted to full-blown torture or
to 'merely' cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.").
77. For an excellent summary of the evolution of ECHR jurisprudence in this area, see
Rodley, supra note 13, at 467.
78. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 94 (1978) (finding that
"the use of the five techniques in August and October 1971 constituted a practice of inhuman
and degrading treatment, which practice was in breach of Article 3" and that the use "did not
constitute a practice of torture within the meaning of Article 3").
79. See id. at 58 ("[Tlhe Commission accepted the allegations that: the treatment of
persons in custody, in particular the methods of interrogation of such persons, constituted an
administrative practice in breach of Article 3 . ....)
80. See id at 40 ("The applicant Government submitted written evidence to the
Commission in respect of 228 cases concerning incidents between 9 August 1971 and 1974.").
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and written documents relating to an additional forty-one.8' The five
techniques at issue were wall standing, hooding, subjection to noise, sleep
deprivation, and deprivation of food and drink.8 The detainees were
interrogated over a period of several days but seldom were held longer than one
week. 83
The Commission heard these cases in 1972 and concluded unanimously
that "the combined use of the five techniques in the cases before it constituted a
practice of inhuman treatment and of torture in breach of Article 3 ."84 After the
Commission's final report was filed with the Council of Europe in 1976, the
Republic of Ireland made application to the European Court of Human Rights,
as the superior body, asking that it "confirm the opinion of the Commission that
breaches of the Convention have occurred. 8
In response to this application, the court considered the distinction
between torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. Because this opinion was
decided before the ratification of the CAT, the court turned to a definition
provided by UN General Assembly Resolution 3452, which described torture
as "an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment."8 6 The court concluded that "[a]lthough the five techniques, as
applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading
treatment, .. . they did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and
cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood."8 7
81. See id ("The Commission examined in detail with medical reports and oral evidence
16 'illustrative' cases selected at its request by the applicant Government. The Commission
considered a further 41 cases ... on which it had received medical reports and invited written
comments....)
82. See id at 42 (discussing the five techniques used during the interrogations). The court
described wall-standing as a "stress position" in which detainees are forced to stand spread-
eagled against a wall with their feet back away from the wall, causing all of their weight to be
borne by the fingers and toes. Id. Hooding is the practice of keeping detainees' heads and faces
covered by an opaque hood whenever they are not being interrogated. Id. Subjection to noise
involved keeping detainees in a room in which there was a continuous loud hissing noise. Id.
Sleep deprivation is self-explanatory, although the court did not discuss a specific timeframe.
Id The court described deprivation of food and drink as keeping the detainees on a "reduced
diet" during their stay at the interrogation centers (which lasted for several days but seldom
exceeded one week). Id.
83. See id at 41-48 (discussing the instances where the five techniques were used and
finding that one man was interrogated for less than a day while others were "subjected to the
five techniques during four or possibly five days").
84. Id. at 59.
85. Id. at 60.
86. Id. at 67 (citations omitted).
8 7. Id
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Since Ireland, the court has stated that the level of severity required for a
showing of torture, as opposed to inhuman and degrading treatment, has
decreased. 8 In cases such as Selmouni v. France,9 the court has found that
severe beatings that leave sequelae can rise to the level of torture, even though
such injuries formerly were viewed as evidence of inhuman and degrading
treatment. 90 It is not clear, however, whether this development changes the
Ireland court's holding that the five techniques constituted inhuman and
degrading treatment but not torture.
Another oft-cited case examining the use of coercive interrogations is
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel,9' handed down by the
Israeli Supreme Court in 1999. The Israeli Supreme Court considered
allegations that coercive techniques used by Israeli security forces, which were
similar to those examined in Ireland, violated international law.9 The
techniques under review in Committee Against Torture included hooding,
shaking, stress positions, and sleep deprivation.9 The Israeli Supreme Court
concluded that these techniques were illegal, although it did not address
whether they constituted torture rather than cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment, which is also prohibited.94 The court's general approach was to
allow any physical restrictions on the prisoners that are inherently necessary in
a custodial interrogation.95 Therefore, some interruption in the prisoner's
88. See Rodley, supra note 13, at 477-80 (discussing the decreasing relevance of
aggravation of pain and severity to the definition of torture).
89. See Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 151, 189 (finding that the Government
violated Article 3 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention).
90. See Rodley, supra note 13, at 476-77 (discussing the Selmouni court's approach to
defining torture under the Convention); id at 477 ("Evidently the Selmouni court was accepting
that sustained beatings leaving physical sequelae, which it would previously have categorized as
inhuman and degrading treatment, was now to be considered as torture.").
91. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 54(4) 817,
reprinted in 3 8 I.L.M. 147 1.
92. See id. at 1476 ("These methods, argue the applicants, are in violation [of]
International Law as they constitute 'Torture,' which is expressly prohibited under International
Law. Thus, the GSS investigators are not authorized to conduct these interrogations.").
93. See id. at 1474-76 (describing the physical means employed by the GSS
investigators). Like the Ireland opinion, the Israeli Supreme Court failed to discuss a specific
duration with respect to sleep deprivation. Id. at 1476.
94. See id. at 1482-85 (stating the reasons why each of the techniques under review were
prohibited methods of interrogation).
95. See id at 1489 ("[W~e declare that the GSS does not have the authority to 'shake' a
man, hold him in the 'Shabach' position.,... force him into a 'rog crouch' position and deprive
him of sleep in a manner other than that which is inherently required by the interrogation.").
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normal sleep routine was expected and permissible, as long as he was not
deprived of sleep for a prolonged period for the purpose of "breaking him."96
The Israeli Supreme Court went on to analyze the question of whether the
contours of the "necessity" defense could be established ex ante to determine
what sort of exigent circumstances might allow the use of otherwise prohibited
coercive techniques. 97 The court declined to provide such guidance, stating that
"[n]ecessity is certainly not a basis for establishing a broad detailed code of
behavior such as how one should go about conducting intelligence
interrogations in security matters, when one may or may not use force, how
much force may be used and the like."98 Although this opinion does little to
clarify our understanding of the difference between torture and cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment, by strictly limiting conduct to just that which is
inherent in custodial questioning, it comes close to prohibiting any form of
coercive interrogation. Of course, this prohibition remains subject to the
necessity defense, which allows for coercive techniques under certain ill-
defined circumstances that constitute sufficient exigency. It is under these
circumstances where the line between torture, which is subject to a
nonderogable prohibition, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, which
is not, becomes important.
Overall, these decisions provide a general idea of the line between
permissible conduct and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. They are less
clear on the distinction, if any legal distinction still remains, between cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment, and torture. The opinions also are
necessarily limited to their facts. So while they may firmly establish that, for
example, shaking is impermissible, they provide little guidance for how to
address the latest piece of human ingenuity in the field of inflicting pain upon
one's fellow man.
D. Expansive Definitions of Torture
Some commentators have argued for an expansive reading of the
definition of torture established by the CAT.99 This argument often begins by
96. See id. at 1484 ("if the suspect is intentionally deprived of sleep for a prolonged
period of time, for the purpose of tiring him out or 'breaking' him-it shall not fall within the
scope of a fair and reasonable investigation.").
97. See id. at 1486 ("The question before us is whether it is possible to infer the authority
to, in advance, establish permanent directives setting out the physical interrogation means that
may be used under conditions of 'necessity."').
9 8. Id
99. See, e.g., John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and
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examining the perverse dynamic of interrogational torture, in which the victim
is asked to provide information to end the torture'o' and his continued failure to
do so places the responsibility for continued torture on the victim's "consent" to
continue. Because the interrogator is the only one who can decide whether the
withdrawal of consent (the information provided) is sufficient, the dynamic of
torture is defined as the utter and complete domination of one individual by
another.'0 ' "The suspect's endurance is based partly on his self-confidence and
self-respect; the aim of the interrogator is to destroy these components of his
character, as well as his consciousness of himself, his, 1., 102 This destruction
of the suspect's identity and worldview has less to do with the severity of the
pain inflicted than it does with the torturer's ability to escalate the pain or
coercion being used.10 3 This leads one commentator, Professor John Parry, to
conclude that torture need not involve severe pain. He finds that a practice is
torture even though it "lasts relatively briefly and causes less than severe pain,
if it does so against a background of total control and potential escalation that
asserts the state's dominance over the victim." 30' Although Parry concedes that
his proposed definition broadens the one found in the Convention, it could be
argued that his definition can be linguistically reconciled with the CAT by
characterizing the conduct as the intentional infliction of severe suffering,
which the CAT prohibits.
While this proposed definition, whether viewed as an interpretation of the
CAT or a proposed expansion of its coverage, is intellectually appealing, it is
practically problematic. By focusing on escalation and the assertion of
dominance or control over the victim, the definition could be used to describe
Abroad, in TowRuRtE: A COLLECTioN, supra note 15, at 154 ("This definition broadens the
Convention's carefully negotiated definition of torture and deliberately blurs the uneasy
distinction between torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.");
Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission Report: Was the Security Service
Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the "Needs" of the Security Service?, 23 ISR. L. Rrv.
216.252 (1989) ("It turns out, then, that what the Commission describes as 'moderate physical
pressure' which does not reach the point of torture or degrading treatment is none other than
degrading treatment or torture.").
100. See Shue, supra note 27, at 53 (discussing the difference between interrogational
torture, that some may contend is justifiable under certain circumstances, and terroristic torture
employed purely as punishment).
101. See Parry, supra note 15, at 247 (describing the logic of torture as being about
"complete domination").
102. Kremnitzer, supra note 99, at 250.
103. See Parry, supra note 99, at 153 ("Indeed, the victim's knowledge of the torturer's
ability to escalate the pain at will is an important component of torture's dominating, world-
destroying capacity.").
104. Id. at 153-54.
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practically any custodial interrogation as torture. The detention of any
individual against his or her will is an exercise of "the state's dominance over
the victim." 05 And, as discussed in Part 111.B3, interrogations usually involve
some form of "escalation" or negotiation over the provision or withdrawal of
privileges, creature comforts or "luxuries" such as a favorite food. When the
past use of allegations of torture by terrorist groups is considered, 306 there is a
reason to pause before creating an overinclusive definition of torture that
undermines the seriousness of the charge being leveled.10 7
E. Restrictive Definitions of Torture
While overly expansive definitions of torture may risk undermining the
seriousness of torture allegations, overly restrictive definitions result in
unacceptable harm being visited upon detainees. The acceptance of very
narrowly drawn definitions of torture permits a wide range of conduct that most
observers would facially consider to be torture. The most infamous
"restrictive" definition of torture almost certainly is the "Bybee Memo" written
by John Yoo and Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House
Counsel Alberto Gonzales on August 1, 2002. Its second paragraph contains
the oft-quoted sentence stating that "[p]hysical pain amounting to torture must
be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury,
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily fuinction, or even death."' 0 8
Because there was widespread disagreement with this definition of "severe
pain," it does little to further our understanding of how torture should be
defined. But the story of how this definition was arrived at speaks volumes.
The definition was drafted by John Yoo in answer to the Bush
Administration's questions about the limits on coercive interrogation, questions
prompted by the capture of Abu Zubaydah, al-Qaeda's chief of operations, in
March 2002.'09 Until Zubaydah' s capture, questions about the boundaries of
105. Id at 153.
106. See infra Part V.B.lI for a discussion of RAF complaints of "isolation torture."
107. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 238 ("1 think it is especially important to differentiate
between 'degrading treatment' and 'torture,' lest one end up trivializing the concept of torture
and diminishing the special horror attached to that term.").
108. Bybee Memo, supra note 15, at 1.
109. See John R. Richardson, Is John Yoo a Monster?, EsQuIRE, June 2008, at 126, 131
[hereinafter YooJ, available at http://www.esquire.coni/features/john-yoo-0608 ("But they did
believe that this was a strange new kind of war, where the front lines were inside the heads of
men like Padilla and Abu Zubaydab. So, what about things like isolation, prolonged
interrogation, forced exercise, and limited sleep? Where was the line, exactly?").
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acceptable interrogation practices were thought of as an academic exris."
But when it became apparent that Zubaydah was successfully resisting the
standard interrogation techniques being employed, Yoo was tasked with
describing where exactly the line should be drawn."' He was asked to draw
this line when his answer was urgently needed to extract information from a
man that undoubtedly possessed a vast knowledge of al-Qaeda operations,
which targeted U.S. troops in Afghanistan and civilians throughout the
world. "'
Yoo considered the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2340' ~and § 2340A, 14 the
statutes passed by Congress in response to the United States' ratification of the
Convention Against Torture. The statutes prohibited the infliction of "severe
physical or mental pain,""' but what did that mean in practice? The Justice
Department had never prosecuted anyone for violating this statute, so there
were no U.S. court opinions to guide the definition." 6 The European Court of
Human Rights opinion in Ireland held that a combination of several techniques
such as hooding, stress positions, noise, and sleep deprivation amounted to
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, but not torture. 117 So Yoo turned to
language found in other U.S. statutes that defined severe pain in the context of
emergency health care.'1 It was from these statutes that the terms "severe
organ failure or death" were extracted."19 The memo did go on to describe
other practices that clearly constituted torture, including the use of electric
110. See id ("But this was all just an academic exercise until late March 2002, when the
CIA captured AI-Qaeda's chief of operations, a man named Abu Zubaydah.").
I111. See id. ("On top of that, Zubaydah was an expert in interrogation and how to resist
interrogation.").
112. See id. ("They approached Yoo and said they had solid reasons to believe that
Zubaydah knew the names of hundreds of terrorists and the details of attack plans that could
include nuclear weapons.").
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006) (defining "torture" and "severe mental pain or
suffering").
114. See id. § 2340A (establishing "torture" as a criminal offense).
115. Id. § 2340(1).
116. Yoo, supra note 109, at 150.
117. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 80 (1978) ("Although the
five techniques, applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading
treament ... they did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by
the word torture as so understood.").
118. Bybee Memo, supra note 15, at 5 ("Significantly, the phrase 'severe pain' appears in
statutes defining an emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health
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shocks, rape, extracting teeth, mock executions, beatings with metal pipes,
etc.,'12 0 but the damage done to effective self-enforcement by the one sentence
in the summary, equating torture with the pain associated with organ failure or
death, is incalculable.
Although portions of this memo were later rescinded, 121' the fact that it was
adopted at all illustrates why meaningful self-enforcement of the international
prohibition against torture is unlikely to be successful. Contrary to some
claims, 122 Yoo probably is not a "monster," and his response to this situation
certainly is not unique. As Part V will illustrate, when someone is tasked with
legally defining the boundaries of torture in a time critical situation, where the
lives of many civilians may depend upon the answer provided, whether the
author is German, British, Israeli, or American, the Bybee Memo, or something
that looks very much like it, is likely to be the result. 123 While this may be
intensely disappointing, it should not be surprising.
F. The Price of Indeterminacy
The widely varying interpretations of the Convention's actual scope make
it clear that any practical consensus on the current definition of torture is
illusory. As a result, the broad agreement on the words used to define torture
actually may do more harm than good. While international law can claim to
have successfully implemented a convention that has received overwhelming
support, such a claim of success is hollow. Because transnational legal
enforcement mechanisms in this area are relatively weak, self-enforcement is
critical to upholding the international prohibition against torture." Yet the
subjectivity of the definition that lies at the heart of the Convention makes
meaningful self-enforcement extremely unlikely. This is because the
prohibition against inflicting severe pain or suffering does little to establish
120. See id. at 24 ("[I]t is likely a court would find that allegations of such treatment would
constitute torture: (1) severe beatings ... ; (2) threats of imminent death. ... ; (3) threats of
removing exremities; ... (5) electric shocks .. . ; (6) rape or sexual assault ..... )
121. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., Regarding Legal Standards Applicable Under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc
23402340a2.htm.
122. See Yoo, supra note 109, at 126 ("[John Yoo has] been accused of war crimes and
compared to the Nazi lawyers who justified Hitler.").
123. For a discussion of analogous responses in similar circumstances, see infra Part V.
124. See Hathaway, supra note 25, at 520 ("Where international bodies are less active in
enforcement of treaty commitments-as in the areas of human rights and the environent-it
falls to domestic institutions to fill the gap.").
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behavioral boundaries. It leaves the practical meaning of the term to the eye of
the beholder. When the time comes for a national government to determine
whether it is resorting to torture under international law, the circumstances that
have brought it to that point almost certainly will make a good faith
interpretation impossible.
V Detention, Interrogation, and Terror
A. Common Reactions to Terror Threats
This part of the Article examines the reaction of several states to terrorist
threats. When states are placed under pressure by terrorist groups, they
invariably respond by enacting legislation designed to counter the threat. This
legislation typically includes prosecution-friendly changes in judicial process
and procedure, and harsher detention and interrogation policies. Like the
United States' reaction to the 2001 attacks discussed above, the responses of
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Israel to terrorist threats all included
measures that were criticized by human rights organizations as either torture or
inhuman and degrading treatment that allegedly violated the human rights
conventions to which each state was a signatory. The purpose of examining the
responses of these states to terror threats is not to determine whether the
allegations of torture were well founded, nor is it to attempt to outline some
form of state practice justify'ing such behavior.12 5 Rather, it is to illustrate
further the fatal flaw in the current definition of torture when it is implemented
within the present system of international law.
Because compliance with the prohibition on the use of torture in the
present system largely relies on self-enforcement,126 the subjectivity and
malleability of the current standard undermines the effectiveness of the
prohibition, even in states that are serious about abiding by their treaty
obligations. By effectively leaving the interpretation of "severe pain and
suffering" to the eye of the beholder, the current system hopes that states will
125. It should be noted that even consistent state practice could not justify' such measures.
The fact that all of these states (and many others not examined carefully in this section, such as
Colombia and Sri Lanka) responded to terrorist threats with similar measures does not diminish
the individual culpability of each state for doing so. Each state had a positive treaty obligation
not to engage in torture or inhuman and degrading treatment and even a clearly established
customary state practice of other nations does not excuse a violation of positive obligations.
Further, the prohibition against torture is a fairly established jus cogens norm, which, by
definition, cannot be avoided by treaty, let alone by a claim of custom.
126. See Hathaway, suipra note 25, at 520 (noting areas, such as human rights, where
international bodies do not enforce treaty commitments as vigorously).
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interpret this definition in good faith. The fact that the question of how torture
is defined usually arises under circumstances that make a good faith
interpretation almost impossible for a government charged with protecting its
citizens, means that the current system's "hope" has proven time and again to
be a forlorn one.
B. Specific Examples
1. Germany
During the 1 970s, the Red Army Faction (RAE), also known as the
Baader-Meinhof gang, conducted numerous terrorist attacks against West
German targets.'127 During a series of sporadic bombings and bank robberies
between 1970 and 1974, the RAF killed at least eight police officers, judges,
industrialists, and U.S. Army personnel and wounded dozens of others. 
128
After most of the founding members were arrested, the group staged a dramatic
takeover of the West German embassy in Sweden in 1975. 129 When their
demands for their colleagues' release were not met, the RAF executed two
diplomats before the accidental detonation of an RAE bomb, designed to
destroy the building, ended the siege. 130 The German government's refusal to
negotiate with the RAF in Stockholm and the RAF's public execution of
German diplomats during the siege hardened both sides' approach to the
continuing struggle.13 1
127. See Wolfgang S. Heinz, Germany: State Responses to Terrorist Challenges and
Human Rights, in NATIONAL INSECuRITy AND HumAN RIGHTS: DEMOCRACIES DEBATE
CoTJNTERTERRoRism 157, 162 (Alison Brysk & Gershon Shafir eds., 2007) (noting that the most
eventful years for the RAF were between 1970 and 1977, in which twenty-eight people died
from assassinations or shootings).
128. See Richard Huffmuan, The Baader-Meinhof Gang at the Dawn of Terror,
http://www.baader-meinhof.com/timeline/timeline.html (last visited Feb. 22,2010) (describing
the activities and assassinations of the Baader-Meinhof Gang in the early 1970s) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. See id. at http://www.baader-meinhof.con/timeline/1975.html ("24 April, Stockholm:
Six Red Army Faction terrorists, most of whom were former members of the Heidelberg
Socialist Patients Collective (SPK), take over the West German Embassy in Stockholm, taking
11I hostages.").
130. See id (describing how the terrorists killed Lieutenant Colonel Baron Andreas von
Mirchbach and Dr. Heinz Hillegart before a wiring short caused the TNT to explode
prematurely).
13 1. See id (describing the escalating tensions between the German government and the
RAF).
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As the two-year trial of the RAF leadership came to a close in 1977, the
"second-generation" RAE stepped up their attacks, killing a federal prosecutor,
his driver, and his bodyguard in April.13 2 After the trial concluded with the
conviction and sentencing of the original RAE members, the group responded
with a series of attacks that became known as the "German Autumn."133 At the
end of July, Jurgen Ponto, the chairman of the Dresdener Bank, was shot and
killed in his home by three RAF members.13 4 After a failed rocket attack on the
Federal Prosecutor's Office in Karlsruhe in August, the RAF kidnapped Hanns-
Martin Schleyer, the President of the Confederation of German Employers'
Associations and the Federation of German Industries on September 513 In
this attack, they killed the three police officers assigned to protect Schleyer as
well as his driver.'136
When the RAF demanded that its imprisoned leaders be flown to foreign
nations of its choosing, the German government stalled and prolonged the
negotiated details of the flights for over a month.13 7  In mid-October, a
Lufihansajet of German tourists was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists affiliated
with the RAF1 3 8 The hijackers demanded the release of the RAE leadership,
and over the next five days ordered the jet flown from Rome to Cyprus,
Bahrain, Dubai, Yemen, and ultimately Somalia.13 9 The terrorists executed the
plane's captain in Yemen 140 before ordering the co-pilot to fly on to Mogadishu
where they threatened to blow up the plane if the RAF prisoners were not
132. See id. at http://www.baader-meinhofcom/timeline/1977.html ("7 April, Karlsruhe:
Federal Prosecutor General Siegfried Buback is murdered, along with two others, near his home
in Karlsruhe.").
133. See id. ("5 September, Cologne: Hanns-Martin Schleyer. .. is kidnapped from his
car, despite the protection of three poieofficers.... This is the first day of what would later
be called 'the German Autumn. "').
134. See id ("30 July, Oberursel: . Albrecht, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, and an unidentified
man, shoot Ponto five times, killing him.").
13 5. Id
13 6. Id
137. See Huffinan, supra note 128, at http://www.baader-meinhof.com/timeline /1977.html
("13-21 September, Wiesbaden: The BKA, through Denis Payot, spends as much time as
possible stalling the kidnappers, dragging out the details of the escape flight for the prisoners.
The kidnappers grow impatient.").
138. See Terror and Triumph at Mogadishu, TImE, Oct. 31, 1977, at 42 [hereinafter Terror
and Triumph] (reporting on the hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 18 1).
139. See id. at 42-43 (describing the flight path and movements of the Palestinian
hijackers).
140. See id at 43 ("When [the pilot] climbed back aboard, Mahmud confronted him in a
towering rage. 'Are you guilty or not guilty?' he yelled, forcing the pilot at gunpoint to kneel at
the head of the cabin aisle. Then Mahniud placed a pistol in Schumann's face and killed him
with one bullet.").
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freed. 14 1 Meanwhile, German GSG-9 commandos, an anti-terrorist unit created
after the massacre of the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich,14 2 that
had been shadowing the plane's movements around the Persian Gulf landed at
the Mogadishu airpot.143 Shortly before the hijackers' latest deadline expired,
the commandos successfully stormed the plane, killing three hijackers and
wounding the fourth.'"4 One commando, one crew member, and four
passengers sustained minor injuries.1
45
That night in Germany, the imprisoned RAF leadership allegedly learned
of the demise of the hijackers from a radio that had been smuggled in to them
by their lawyers.'4 Four of the RAF leaders attempted suicide that night.1
47
Three of them died within a day while the fourth's stab wounds to her chest
narrowly missed her heart.'14 8 When word of the suicides broke the next day,
the RAF members holding Schieyer killed him and left his body in the trunk of
a car to be found a few days later.'149 The suicides and Schleyer's killing ended
the "Germnan Autumn" and effectively ended the RAF, despite the fact that
some of the "second generation" members conducted sporadic acts of terror
over the next several years.'1
50
141. See id ("Next morning, with Co-Pilot Jfirgen Victor, 35, at the controls, Charlie Echo
flew on to Mogadishu, capital of Somalia.").
142. See New Breed of Commando, TiME, Oct. 31, 1977, at 44 ("GrenzschutzgruppeNeun,
or Border Protection Group 9, was created five years ago, after a bungled West German rescue
attempt led to the Munich massacre of nine Israeli hostages and five of their Palestinian
captors.,,).
143. See Terror and Triumph, supra note 138, at 43 (describing how a German 707 with a
contingent of GSG-9 commandos took off from Crete and landed in Mogadishu).
144. See id at 44 (describing how twenty-eight German commandos successfully stormed
the aircraft, killing Mabmud and two others and wounding the fourth).
145. See id. ("One commando, one stewardess and four passengers were slightly injured.
Except for the murdered Captain Schumann, all the hostages survived.").
146. See Richard Huffman, supra note 128, at http://www.baader-meinhof.conm/
timeline/1977.htmld (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) ("Backmi Stammheim, Raspe has been following
the drama on his small, smuggled transistor radio. After hearing of the success of the raid, he
spends the next few hours talking to Baader, Ensslin, and M61ler on their secret 'phone' system.
They agree to a suicide pact.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
147. See id. (describing the attempts of Baader, Raspe, Ensslin, and M61ler attempt to
committed suicide on the night of October 17).
148. See id (noting that Baader, Raspe, and Ensslin successfully commit suicide, while
M6ller came within millimeters of stabbing her heart).
149. See id ("19 October, Paris: ... After police find Schleyer's body in the trunk of the
Audi, they determine that he had been shot three times in the head, probably while kneeling in a
forest (his mouth had pine needles in it).").
150. See Heinz, supra note 127, at 162 (noting that, while the RAF assassinated twenty-
eight people in the 1970s, only thirteen assassinations occurred between 1979 and 1993).
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The German government took several legislative measures in response to
the RAF threat. Because there were strong indications that lawyers for the
Baader-Meinhof defendants were collaborating with the defendants and
actively aiding the terrorist struggle, laws were passed that provided for the
exclusion of defense counsel.'5 ' These laws allowed the authorities to prohibit
the hiring of private defense counsel and to appoint defense counsel for the
specified defendants.15 2 Although a striking procedural step, this restriction did
not result in claims of torture or mistreatment.
What did result in such claims was the Kontaktsperre or "isolation law." 5
This law was introduced by the government after Schleyer was kidnapped.154 It
was approved and implemented in just a few days, a record time for legislation
in Germany.'"5 It took effect on September 30, 1977, and allowed for the
government to order the complete isolation of prisoners for up to thirty days if
the government had a "reasonable suspicion" that a terrorist group was
endangering the "physical integrity, life, or liberty of a person."' 56 Lawyers for
the RAF challenged this "isolation torture," as did Amnesty International a
couple of years later. 157 Neither of these challenges dissuaded the German
15 1. See ANTONIO VERCHER, TERRORISM iN EUROPE 245 (1992) ("This measure has its
origin in the innumerable problems caused by the defense counsel of the Baader-Meinhof group,
because of the links and apparent collaboration between the detainees and their lawyers.").
152. See id. ("In those cases, to avoid rendering the suspected terrorist completely
defenseless, the law provides him with the right of attendance of a lawyer, although the lawyer
will be appointed ex officio by the authorities.").
153. See Heinz, supra note 127, at 165 ("When it became likely that lawyers would
challenge the measure before the Federal Constitutional Court, the government introduced a law
permitting the total isolation of prisoners (Kontakisperre), which was approved in a record time
ofjust a few days.").
154. Compare Richard Huffman, The Baader-Meinhof Gang at the Dawn of Terror,
http://www.baader-meinhof.com/timeline/1977.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (noting that
Schleyer was kidnapped on September 5, 1977) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review), with Heinz, supra note 127, at 165 (indicating that the "isolation law" was passed
during the Lufthansa hijacking on October 13, 1977).
155. Heinz, supra note 127, at 165.
156. See VERCHER, supra note 151, at 246 ("Regarding incommunication of the suspected
terrorists, the Law of 30 September 1977 Amending the Introductory Act to the Law of the
Constitution of Courts (Incommunicado Law) introduced some provisions regulating the barring
of prisoners from contact with the outside world." (footnote omnitted)); see also Ensslin v. Fed.
Republic of Germany, 14 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 64,95 (1978) ("On 2 October 1977,
under a legislative amendment which had entered into force on the same day
(Kontaktsperregesetz), the Federal Minister of Justice ordered the suspension of all contacts of
the applicants with each other and with the outside world, including oral and written contacts
with their defence counsel ..... )
157. See Heinz, supra note 127, at 165-66 ("One of the most difficult and emotional issues
were allegations made by RAF prisoners and their defense lawyer that they were actually
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government from continuing the practice of isolating RAF prisoners, even
though the prisoners' health seriously deteriorated.'
Following the suicides of the three RAF prisoners, 159 their families
petitioned the European Commission of Human Rights for a ruling that, inter
alia, the social isolation authorized by the Kontakrsperre violated Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights.'60 While the Human Rights
Commission ultimately rejected these claims, it recognized that isolation may
constitute inhuman treatment violative of Article 3.161 "Complete sensory
isolation coupled with complete social isolation can no doubt ultimately destroy
the personality; thus it constitutes a form of inhuman treatment which cannot be
justified by the requirements of security, the prohibition on torture and inhuman
treatment contained in Article 3 . .. being absolute in character."1
6 2
Compared with the struggles against other terror organizations described
below, Germany's fight against the RAE appears almost trivial. In terms of
both the lives lost and the human rights abuses allegedly perpetrated by the
government in response, these events do not measure up to the struggles against
the IRA, PLO/Hamas, or al-Qaeda. There were no claims of physical violence
against the RAF prisoners, and the conditions of their confinement generally
included access to recreation, television, radio, and books.163 Yet even in these
circumstances, with less than thirty people killed over six years, 64 the
government took unprecedented legislative action to curtail the rights of
prisoners. And for their part, even when the conditions of their confinement
tortured bsuhisolation.... Amnesty International criticized certain aspects of imprisonment
without accepting any allegation of 'torture' . . . .
158. See id at 166 ("[T1he Stammheim court asked independent experts to interview
prisoners. In their reports--confidential, only for the courts-they state that the prisoners'
health had seriously deteriorated.").
159. See Ensslin, 14 Eur. Conim'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 101-02 (describing how, on
October 18R, 1977, Baader and Raspe committed suicide by pistol and Ensslin hung herself in
her cell).
160. See id at 102-03 ("The applicants argued that they were subject to exceptional
conditions of detention .... These conditions of detention, and in particular prolonged
isolation, had been tantamount to torture or, at the very least, to inhuman treatment within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.").
161. See id. at 109 (holding that the dangerousness of the prisoners and the likelihood of
release attempts were compelling reasons for isolation of RAF prisoners, while acknowledging
that isolation could, in certain scenarios, constitute inhuman treatment).
162. Id at 109-10 (citation omitted).
163. See id. at 92-98 (detailing the conditions of the RAF prisoners' detentions).
164. See Heinz, supra note 127, at 162 ("During the most eventful years, 1970-77, twenty-
eight people died from assassinations and shootings ..... )
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were relatively benign, restrictions on television or social interaction with other
RAF members were challenged as torture or inhuman treatment.16
2. United Kingdom
The historical struggle between Britain and Ireland goes back hundreds of
years and was marked by numerous incidents, rebellions, and spikes in
violence.16 6 After a period of relative calm following the end of World War 11,
what became known as "The Troubles" started in the late 1 960s and early
1970s.6 Violence rapidly escalated in 197 1.16 In 1971 and 1972, 644 people
were killed by sectarian violence in Northern Ireland.16 9 In July 1972 alone,
there were ninety-five killings, nearly 200 explosions, and 2,800 shooting
incidents.17 0 All this occurred in a geographical area smaller than Connecticut.
The British response to the violence was swift, and changes were made in
both criminal procedure and interrogation methodology. In the realm of
criminal procedure "Diplock courts" were created to deal with the special
challenges of prosecuting suspected terrorists.'17' These courts took their name
from the commission report that recommended the changes.172 The report first
recommended that crimes commonly linked to terrorist organizations, which it
165. For a discussion of the allegations by RAF prisoners of torture and inhuman
treatment, see supra note 157 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Christopher K. Connolly, Living on the Past: The Role of Truth
Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies and the Case Study of Northern Ireland, 39 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 401, 411 (2006) ("Northern Ireland's history is particularly long, complex, and
violent.").
167. See, e.g., id. at 415 (indicating that "The Troubles" erupted after 1969).
168. See Police Service of Northern Ireland, Deaths Due to the Security Situation in
Northern Ireland, 1 969-August 31, 2009, http ://www.psni.police.uk/deadis,_cy.pdf(last visited
Feb. 22, 20 10) (indicating a seven-fold increase in killings between 1970 and 1971 in Northern
Ireland) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
169. See id (indicating that 174 were killed in 1971 and an additional 470 were killed in
1972).
170. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at42 (1978) ("In July 1972
alone, 21 members of the security forces and 74 civilians were killed; in addition, there were
nearly 200 explosions and 2,800 shooting incidents.").
17 1. See VERCHER, supra note 15 1, at 120-21 (explaining that the Diplock courts were
created and specifically tailored to deal with the prosecution of terrorist activities in Northern
Ireland).
172. See id. at 120 ("In 1972 the British government set up a Commission under the
chairmanship of Lord Diplock to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in
Northern Ireland.").
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termed "scheduled offences," should be tried before courts employing modified
criminal procedures.173
These modified procedures included the elimination of juries174 and the
possible admission of confessions obtained through coercion.175 The rationale
for eliminating juries was two-fold. There were concerns about both juror
intimidation and jury nullification.176 The primary reason for suspending the
rules excluding confessions obtained through coercion simply was the practical
problem of obtaining convictions without them.177  The Diplock Report
recommended that "[amny inculpatory admission made by the accused may be
given in evidence unless it is proved on a balance of probabilities that it was
obtained by subjecting the accused to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment," 17 8 thereby placing the burden of proof on the defendant to show that
he had been subjected to torture or inhuman treatment. Although Parliament
did not fuilly adopt this recommendation, it implemented an intermediate
standard that allowed confessions to be introduced into evidence if the
prosecution could satisfactorily rebut the defendant's prima facie evidence that
the confession was obtained through "torture or ... inhuman or degrading
treatment."179 These changes remained in place until the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1987 180 expanded the provision's scope to
protect against the introduction of admissions induced by "violence or threat of
violence (whether or not amounting to tortre) .... 118 1
173. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, COMMISSION ON LEGAL
PROCEDURES To DEAL wrrH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cm. 5185, at 3
[hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT] ('Recommended changes in the administration ofjustice, unless
otherwise stated, apply only to cases involving terrorist crimes, defined as scheduled
offences ..... )
174. See id. at 18 ('We recommend that for the Scheduled Offences in Parts I and 11 trial
by judge alone should take the place of trial by jury for the duration of the emergency.').
175. See id. at 32 (" [T~he current technical rules, practice and judicial discretions as to the
admissibility of confession ought to be suspended for the duration of the emergency in respect
of Scheduled Offences. . . .
176. See VERCHER, supra note 151, at 125-33 (discussing the decision of the Diplock
report to eliminate juries in order to avoid both juror intimidation and juror nullification).
177. See id at 141-42 ("Approximately 75-80 per cent of all prosecutions which are
brought for scheduled offences rely for evidence on confessions.").
178. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 173, at 32.
179. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 6 (N. Ir.); see also
VERCHER, supra note 15 1, at 144 ("Parliament did not accept the Diplock recommendation in its
original form, and instead adopted an intermediate formula between the Report's proposal and
the ordinary common-law approach.").
180. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1987, c. 30, § 5 (N. Jr.).
181. Id; see VERCHER, supra note 151, at 142-43 (noting that Section 8 of the NIEPA
1978 was replaced by Section 5 of the NIEPA 1987 which, among other things, requires a
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In reaction to the sparse and outdated intelligence information that they
possessed on the IRA in early 1971, senior British intelligence officials met
with members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUG) special branch in
April of that year.112 During that meeting it was determined that this
intelligence gap could be closed through a massive series of arrests and the use
of the five interrogation techniques (wall-standing, hooding, etc.) discussed in
Part II.C.'83 Shortly after the July spike in violence, this program of arrests and
interrogations was implemented, resulting almost immediately in a stream of
complaints of mistreatment.'84 In response to the complaints, a Committee of
Enquiry headed by Sir Edmund Compton was established to look into the
complaints. 185 The Compton Report concluded that ill-treatment had taken
place during the interrogations, but ascribed this to the inadequate application
of the techniques, rather than to any impropriety in the use of such
techniques. 186 This initial failure of self-enforcement was sharply criticized,'817
and several months later, after the violence had somewhat subsided, the
government announced that the use of these techniques would be
discontinued.188
3. Israel
This same pattern of violence triggering a harsh governmental reaction,
followed by an internal investigation supporting the harsh reaction, and
concluding with an eventual retreat from the use of harsh techniques also was
showing by the accused of the prima facie elements of torture in order to exclude testimony).
182. VERCHER, supra note 151, at 65-66.
183. See id. at 66 (describing "the Five Techniques" as an interrogation method consisting
of hooding, isolation from communication, sleep deprivation, food deprivation, and wall-
standing). For a further discussion of these interrogation techniques, see supra Part II.C.
184. Id. at 66-67.
185. See generally HOME DEPARTmENT, REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS
AGAINST TH-E SECURITY FORCES OF PHYSICAL. BRUTALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARISING OUT OF
THE EvENTS OF 9TH AUGUST, 197 1, Cmnd. 4823.
186. See id. at vi (concluding that the authorized interrogation methods were neither cruel
nor brutal and any problems with interrogations stemmed from the difficulty of implementing
the existing rules "in circumstances in which rigorous and intensive interrogation is vitally and
urgently necessary"); see also VERCHER, supra note 15 1, at 67 ("The Compton Report ... stated
that adverse findings were solely due to the inadequate application of the techniques.").
187. See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Interrogation in Depth: The Compton and Parker Reports,
35 MOD. L. REv. 501, 502 (1972) (noting that the reports significantly downplayed the nature
and effect of the treatment suffered by the detainees at issue).
188. VERCHER, supra note 151, at 67.
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seen in Israel. Israel's decades-long struggle with terrorism is a matter of
common knowledge. From spectacular attacks, such as the killing of eleven
Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, to the thousands that
have been killed in the ebb and flow of violence since the end of the Six-Day
War in 1967, the Israeli government has been under near constant pressure to
protect its citizens against such violence. In the 1 980s, Israel was involved in a
domestically unpopular occupation of Lebanon, and questions about the
conduct of its security services came to the forefront in 1987.
The issue of Israeli General Security Services' (GSS) use of coercive
interrogations against suspected terrorists was called into question in 1987 after
two incidents raised serious concerns about the treatment of Palestinian
prisoners. The first event, the "300 bus affair," occurred on April 12, 1984,
when four Palestinian terrorists hijacked bus number 300 with forty-one
passengers on board.'189 The bus was forced to drive to the Gaza Strip where a
standoff ensued. The Palestinians demanded the release of 500 PLO members
being held in Israeli jails.'90 The Israelis refused to meet the demands and
stormed the bus early the following morning. Two hijackers and one soldier
were killed and seven passengers were wounded in the assault. 91 The public
was told that the other two hijackers were mortally wounded during the assault
and had died on their way to the hospital. 92 A photograph showing the
remaining two hijackers walking off the bus, injured but alive, had been banned
by the Israeli Military Censor.19 3 It was later discovered that the GSS members
had been ordered to kill the other hijackers by Avrahan Shalom, the head of
the GSS, once they left the scene.'194 A subsequent investigation resulted in the
resignation, but not the prosecution, of Shalom.' 9 '
189. See Mordichai Kremnitzer, National Security and the Rule ofLaw: A Critique of the
Landau Commission's Report, in NAT'L SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL 153, 153-56
(Avner Yaniv ed., 1993) (describing the details of the "300" bus hijacking and the judicial
inquiries that followed).
190. IAN BLACK & BENNY MORRIS, ISRAEL's SECRET WARS: A HISTORY OF ISRAEL'S
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 402 (199 1).
191. Kremnitzer, supra note 189, at 154.
192. See BLACK & MORRIS, supra note 190, at 403 ("[Tlhe IDF spokesman said that two
terrorists had been killed in the storming of the bus and that the two others had died on their
way to [a] hospital in Ashkelon.").
193. Kremnitzer, supra note 189, at 154.
194. See id. at 155 ("The police investigation revealed that the two terrorists were killed by
the GSS men pardoned by the president's second pardon, under an order from the head of the
GSS.").
195. See id (stating that the director of GSS was pardoned for his involvement in the bus
300 affair shortly after the investigation into the event was commenced).
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The second event, the Izzat Nafsu case, involved the perjury by GSS
members at the treason trial of an Israeli soldier. 196 Nafsu had been convicted
of treason in 1982 although he had claimed that his confession had been
extracted under torture. 19 7  A "trial within a trial" (the Israeli term for a
suppression hearing) had been held to determine whether the confession was
admissible. 198 GSS members testified during the "trial within a trial" that the
confession had been voluntary and that no coercion had been used.' 99
However, when GSS obstruction of investigations into the 300 bus affair in
1984 cast further doubt on the veracity of GSS witnesses, an internal
investigation into the Nafsu case made it apparent not only that GSS members
perjured themselves in that case but also that there was an established practice
of perjury within the GSS that involved denying torture or coercion in any
suppression hearings.t
The Landau Commission was established in response to this crisis of
confidence concerning the GSS and its interrogation methods .20 1 It
acknowledged the various international conventions that prohibit torture and
cruel and inhuman treatment and specifically referenced the five techniques
discussed in Ireland.0 While it labeled the pervasive perjury by the GSS a
"dismal and regrettable" picture, it took satisfaction in the fact that the practice
had been "totally abolished. 2 0 3 More controversially, it also concluded:
196. See ISRAELI GOV'T PRESS OFFICE, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE METHODS OF
INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL. SECURITY SERVICE REGARDING HOSTILE TERRORIST ACTIVITY
(1987), reprinted in 23 IsR. L. REv. 146, 149-54 (1989) [hereinafter LANDAU REPORT]
(describing the trial of Izzat Nafsu and the orchestrated peijury committed by GSS personnel).
197. See id. at 150 (describing Nafsu's allegations and the response given by the court).
198. See id. (describing the suppression hearing including Nafsu's allegations and the
response given by the court).
199. See id. ("These allegations [of coercion] were denied in the testimony under oath of
the interrogators, headed by the person who at that time was Head of the GSS Interrogation
team which investigated Nafsu's case.").
200. See id. at 151 ("[Nafsu's interrogators] claimed that even in giving false testimony at
the trial within a trial, in which they denied having exerted such pressures, they also had not
deviated from accepted practice in the GSS, and this with the knowledge of their superiors.").
201. See MALCOLM EVANS & RODNEY MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE: A STUDY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
T'REATmENT OR PUINISHMENT 42 (1998) (describing the reasons the Landau Commission was
established).
202. See LANDAU REPORT, supra note 196, at 179-81 (referencing the court's treatment of
the five interrogation techniques at issue in Ireland v. United Kingdom).
203. Id. at 163-64.
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The effective interrogation of terrorist suspects is impossible without the
use of means of pressure, in order to overcome an obdurate will not to
disclose information ....
Interrogation of this kind is permissible under the law, as we interpreted it
above, and we think that a confession thus obtained is admissible in a
criminal tra ..
It went on to explain that in cases where psychological pressure was ineffective
in obtaining information, "the exertion of a moderate physical pressure cannot
be avoided.0 05 The Landau Report also included a classified appendix in
which it issued guidelines for the permissible pressure techniques that it
assured readers were less severe than the five techniques described in
Ireland.206
Not surprisingly, these conclusions were met with extensive criticism.207
Some of the criticism mirrored the criticism of ticking time bombs discussed in
Part I.A. It was argued that the certainties claimed to permit the GSS to
conduct such interrogations on the basis of "necessity" were illusory, and that
the balance of the harms was, therefore, not being correctly assessed. 0
Amnesty International was even harsher in its assessment of the Landau
Commission Report, stating:
Israeli security services have routinely tortured Palestinian political
suspects .. , and from 1987 the use of torture was effectively legal. The
effective legalization was possible because the Israeli government and the
judiciary, along with the majority of Israeli society, accepted that the
methods .. , used by the [GSS] were a legitimate means of combating
"terrorism."
209
204. Id at 184.
205. Id.
206. See id at 186 ("[T]he substance of the means of pressure permitted under these
guidelines is less severe than the 'techniques' which occupied the British Commissions of
Inquiry that considered the methods of the war against terrorism in Northern Ireland.").
207. See, e.g., Gur-Arye, supra note 5, at 184-86 (summarizing many of the critical
responses to the Landau Commission's findings); Kremnitzer, supra note 99, at 251 ("[The
Commission's recommended means] applied with the aim of breaking a suspect's resistance
violate his human dignity and necessarily cause him severe mental suffering; they constitute,
therefore, instruments of torture.").
208. See Kremnitzer, supra note 99, at 243-45 (analyzing the deficiencies of the necessity
rule including its susceptibility to manipulation and its tendency to sacrifice the suspect's
identifiable individual interests in order to protect the interests of unidentified individuals facing
an unidentified threat).
209. AmNEsTy INT'L, COMBATING TOR~uRE-A MANUAL FOR ACTION § 2.2 (2003),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ACT40/001/2003/en.
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As described in Part ll.C, the Israeli Supreme Court retreated from the position
taken by the Landau Report in 1999. But as with Germany and the United
Kingdom before it, the Israel government responded to the pressure of protecting its
civilian population from terrorist violence by defining torture very narrowly, and
sanctioning (at least for several years) the use of techniques that many outsiders
would define as torture.
C Implications of State Practice
The pressures faced by Germany when reacting to the violence of the RAF in
the 1 970s, by the United Kingdom when responding to ERA violence in the 1 970s,
by the Landau Commission in Israel when dealing with the Palestinian terrorists,
and by the United States after the 2001 terror attacks, all resulted in the use of
interrogation or detention techniques that have been criticized by human rights
organizations and often have been characterized as torture. In each of these cases,
government officials made claims that their conduct did not violate international
human rights laws. This was because national security concerns and innocent
civilian lives were thought to be in the balance. Whether the exceptional measures
taken by these governments amounted to torture may remain a matter of debate, but
there can be little question that the subjective definition of torture or inhumnan and
degrading treatment applied by these nations under pressure was not the same
definition that would have prevailed under less trying and dangerous circumstances.
This is why the subjective element in defining torture must be eliminated; the
definition of torture should have been the same on September 12,2001 as it was on
September 10, 200 1. Under the present system, such consistency is not possible.
T/7 Defining Torture
A. Effective Rulemaking
When the corrosive effect of subjectivity described in Parts HI and III is
considered in the context of the present international legal system, it becomes
apparent that the current definition has little prospect for success in preventing
torture. If the present definition of torture is indeed broken, what can be done to fix
it? Or more accurately, how may the definition of torture be refined in order to
improve the incentives for self-enforcement? Conceptually, effective rulemaking is
a fairly simple and straightforward process-the desired outcome must be agreed
upon by the parties involved, and incentives must then be created to align the self-
interest of the parties with that outcome. This rather unremarkable proposition may
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seem obvious, but by all appearances it is one that is frequently forgotten by rule
makers of all stripes.
While this conceptualization. of rulemaking is easily articulated, it can be very
difficult to implement particularly in the international law context. Taking nothing
away from the continuing and valuable efforts to create and expand the reach of the
International Criminal Court, as well as regional judicial bodies such as the
European Court of Human Rights, it is clear that international law still lacks a
meaningful enforcement mechanism, particularly in the realm of human rights
protection. The available empirical evidence relating to the effectiveness of the
Convention Against Torture supports this assessment .2 10 This means that, in the
near term at least, the effectiveness of defining torture will be found in its ability to
encourage nations to exercise self-restraint at a time when it is most difficult to do
so. Therefore, the typical criminal law approach, which aligns self-interest with the
desired outcome by promising punishment if the actor to be influenced fails to
deliver that outcome, is inapplicable to the current situation. Absent an enforcement
mechanism that delivers the promised punishment an actor's self-interest is never
properly re-aligned. Other means, therefore, must be found for aligning the self-
interest of an interrogating state in extracting information to protect its civilian
population, with the exercise of desirable self-restraint.
B. The Proposed Standard''
The solution is to define "the infliction of severe pain or suffering," which
represents the absolute limit on coercive inter-rogation techniques, by referencing
preexisting and self-interested limitations on conduct "The infliction of severe pain
or suffering" would be defined as the application of any physical stressors to
detainees that are not applied to the detaining nation's own trainees in a nonpunitive
setting. The nation's self-interest in preserving the health and well-being of its own
trainees will encourage the maintenance (or even the further narrowing) of the Eist of
currently permissible stressors, even in time of war. This is particularly true when it
is considered that in order for a detaining state to be compliant with the proposed
standard it would have to subject hundreds or even thousands of its own trainees to
any stressor that it wanted to use on a handful of detainees.
210. See Hathaway, supra note 26, at 205 (stating that the Convention Against Torture "is
remarkably weak in enforcement").
211. It is important to clarify' that the proposed standard addresses the use of coercion in an
intelligence gathering context, not a law enforcement context. The standard advanced and the
line-drawing that is done is not for the purpose of determining whether evidence obtained from
an interrogation should be admissible in court, but rather to describe clearly what absolute limits
international law should place on coercive interrogations.
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All nations subject their trainees to stressors in order to better prepare them
for the rigors of warfare. In order to protect their trainees, nations also have well
established standards limiting the type and duration of the stressors that can be
applied. When these standards were written, it was never contemplated that they
would limit the scope of interrogations that the state might perform; the only
competing considerations in balance were the effectiveness of the training and the
safety of the trainees. Any changes in these standards that allow for the use of
harsher interrogation methods against detainees will be meaningfully checked by
the interrogating state's belief that the harsher measures do not cause any lasting
physical or emotional harm for its own trainees. The state's self-interest in
protecting its own people, its military and civilian trainees, far more of whomn will
be subjected to these techniques than the handful of detainees that will be
interrogated using such techniques, will provide a meaningful deterrent to
changes in these standards that are likely to lead to permanent harm.21
Basing the treatment of detainees upon the treatment afforded to one's own
forces during wartime is not a new concept in international law. Geneva
Convention (HII) Relative to the Treatment of POWs requires that prisoners must
be "quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the
Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area.",2 13' This convention also
limits the imposition of disciplinary or judicial penalties against POWs to those
that may be imposed against members of the Detaining Power's armed forces of
equivalent rank for thle same acts.21 It also requires that POWs receive the same
judicial process, appellate rights, and the same conditions of pretrial and
postconviction confinement afforded to members of the Detaining Power's armed
215
forces. The sufficiency of equivalent treatment also has been applied to
nonintemnational armed conflicts such as the conflict between the United States
and al-Qaeda. Justice Kennedy indicated that a showing of equivalence
between the judicial treatment of detainees at Guantanamo and that afforded
212. See Robert D. Kaplan, Fear Hath No Shelf-Life: Our Torture Dilemma, ATLAr~rrc
ONLINE, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.theatlantic.com/docJ20090 lu/kaplan-torture (last visited Feb.
22, 2010) (stating that far more American servicemen have been subjected to waterboardmng
than have prisoners at Guantanamo Bay) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also Bradbury Memo, supra note 14, at 37-3 8 ("Each of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques has been adapted from military SERF (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape]
training, where the techniques have long been used on our own troops.").
213. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 25, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
214. Id arts. 87-88.
215. Id arts. 95, 102-03, 106, 108.
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U.S. service personnel under the UCMJ would be sufficient to satisfy Common
Article 3's requirements for "regularly constituted courts.""1 6
Adopting this standard would provide much needed clarity to the
definition of torture. It would also prevent the inevitable contraction of the
definition of "severe pain and suffering" that numerous states have employed
when faced with a terrorist threat. Perhaps most importantly, this standard will
give the term sufficient definiteness to allow for criminal prosecutions that
might well be avoided under the current system. It no longer will be possible to
rely on the arguments provided by qualified legal authorities that advocate a
restrictive definition.
C. Implementation
1. How the Proposal Addresses the Problem
The principal problem with the current definition of torture has two
elements, each of which must be addressed. The subjectivity found in the
CAT's use of "severe pain and suffering," combined with the fact that the
primary adherence mechanism for the prohibition against torture is self-
enforcement, eviscerates the prohibition against torture when a state is under
pressure from terrorist violence. As discussed in Part IIn, even those states that
are solidly supportive of the prohibition against torture have defined away
torture by reading the definition of "severe pain and suffering" more narrowly
during a crisis.
This Article's proposal, attaching a clearer and more objective standard to
"1severe pain and suffering," addresses both of these elements. By clarifying the
line between torture and "not torture," it removes much of the subjectivity
found in the current definition that will, in turn, encourage self-enforcement.
States no longer will be able to point to a Landau Commission Report or a
Compton Commission Report or a Bybee or Bradbury Memo that "legally
determines" that the coercive methods being used do not inflict severe pain or
suffering to avoid prosecuting those that may have crossed the line. Instead
they will have to demonstrate that their training methods and interrogation
methods were the same, or concede that they are unwilling to discharge their
self-enforcement responsibilities under the CAT.
216. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 643-46 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(addressing the question of whether the military commissions can be considered "regularly
constituted courts" by comparing their procedures with the procedural requirements in court-
martial practice under the UCMJ).
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2. Practical Application and Bright Line Rules
In practice, the initial test of whether a specific form of coercion was
permissible would be fairly straightforward. Any stressor or form of physical
treatment that a nation uses in a nonpunitive manner on its own trainees
presumptively would not be considered torture when used on a detainee. This
would be treated as a rebuttable presumption, but one that strongly favors a
detaining state that acts within these limits. Conversely, all coercive methods
that deviate from the stressors that a nation subjects its own trainees to would
be rebuttably presumed to constitute severe pain and suffering unless the
detaining state could provide compelling evidence to overcome this
presumption.
While this objective standard based upon the detaining state's treatment of
its own trainees will provide a great deal of protection for detainees, such a
definition, by itself, is insufficient. Standing alone, such a standard remains
subject to manipulation by the detaining power, and loopholes could be found
to undermine the purpose of the standard, just as verbal loopholes have been
found in the past. To fully and properly protect detainees, this proposed
standard must be supplemented with a short list of bright line rules to close
potential loopholes by forbidding certain conduct that, however unlikely, might
be practiced by a state on its own trainees. These bright line prohibitions
include medical experimentation, exposure to chemical/biological agents,
murder, rape, mock executions, and mutilation.
Medical experimentation on prisoners of war is prohibited by the Geneva
Conventions, and violations of this prohibition are labeled a "grave breach" of
those conventions. 1 Because some states, including the United States, have
engaged in medical experimentation on their own trainees in the past,21 it is
necessary for the proposed objective definition of torture to include an explicit
prohibition against any experimentation on detainees. This provision would
mirror Geneva Convention I1l's prohibition on medical experimentation and
could be amplified further by the Commentary to Article 130 of that
Convention, which describes medical experimentation as
experiments [that] are injurious to body or health and as such are dealt with
in most penal codes. The memory of the criminal practices of which
certain prisoners were victim led to these acts being included in the list of
grave breaches. The prohibition does not, however, deny a doctor the
possibility of using new methods of treatment justified by medical reasons
217. Geneva Convention 111, supra note 213, arts. 13, 130.
218. See generally CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (providing an extensive discussion of
the NM-ULTRA program, which included LSD experimentation on military trainees).
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and based only on concern to improve the state of health of the patient. It
must be possible to use new medicaments offered by science, provided that
219
they are administered only for therapeutic purposes.
Another instance in which the protections that a state provides to its own
trainees may prove insufficient for detainees is in the area of chemical and
biological warfare training. Many nations train their armed forces in the use of
biological/chemical protective gear by exposing them to chemical or biological
agents. In a few cases, there is evidence that this training exposure, while
wearing proper protective gear, is to lethal agents.22 Even if a detaining power
finds trainee casualties in biological or chemical weapons simulations to be an
acceptable price for properly training its forces, it may not use that judgment to
imperil detainees. Therefore, the proposed standard would include a bright line
rule stating that any intentional exposure of detainees to any form of chemical
or biological agent, except for the use of nonlethal agents as a last resort for the
purposes of controlling an uprising within a detention facility, constitutes
torture and is a violation of the CAT.
Murder of detainees already is explicitly prohibited by Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions 22'I and Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1.222 These
prohibitions, coupled with the proposed standard, might seem to make it
unnecessary for the definition of torture to include a bright line rule against
murder. While it is certainly unlikely that any government would intentionally
kill its own trainees, the history of wartime conduct of many nations, and
particularly recent events in the Colombian civil war, should give anyone pause
before asserting that it never happens. 2 It has been reliably reported that the
219. JEAN DE PREUX ET AL., COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PISONERS OF WAR 627-28 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960)
[hereinafter GENEVA III COMMENTARY].
220. See Lev Aleksandrovich Federov, Chemical Weapons in Russia: History, Ecology,
Politics § 1.4 (1994), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/cbw/Jptac 008_19400 l.htrn (last
visited Feb. 22, 20 10) (describing Soviet testing of nerve agents on people as recently as the
1980s) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
221. See Geneva Convention 111, supra note 213, art. 3 (expressly prohibiting "violence to
life and person, in particular murder of all kinds").
222. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, at art. 75(2)(a)(i), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (reincorporating the prohibition of murder from Geneva
Convention III).
223. See, e.g., Sibylla Brodzinsky, In Colombia, Army Acknowledges Civilian Killings,
CHRUsTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 7, 2008, at 7, available at http://www.csmonitor.coml
2008/1 lO7/pO7s 02-wogn.html ("The Army's successes ... have been muted by a macabre
revelation that the Colombian military reportedly killed civilians to inflate their rebel body
count in an effort to appear more successful."); Simon Romero, Colombian Army is Accused of
Killing Poor Civilians and Labeling Them Insurgents, INT'L HERALD Thin., Oct. 29, 2008,
123
1467 WASH. &LEE L. REV 77 (2010)
Colombian Army lured young, unmarried, unemployed men away from home
and murdered them so that their bodies could be used to increase the "body
count" in their ongoing civil war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC).224 Such events require that the murder of detainees be
included as a bright line prohibition within the definition of torture.
Rape perpetrated for the purpose of punishment or intimidation has been
held to be torture by the European Court of Human Rights .225  However
unlikely it is that a state would use rape as a "training tool," a bright line rule
against rape would be included in the proposed definition.
226Like rape, mock executions also have been found to constitute torture,
and like rape, this practice also would be explicitly prohibited. This is
particularly true because there can be no claim of equivalency between a "mock
execution" conducted in training, which will obviously not result in death, and
the mental stress associated with the mock execution of a detainee. 2
The last bright line prohibition would be against mutilation. Like murder,
it already is explicitly prohibited by Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1.228 However, there are a
variety of rites of passage that involve tattooing, branding, or the removal of
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/World/americas/29iht-colombia.4. 17352270.
html ("Columbia's govenent ... has been buffeted by the disappearance of... young,
impoverished men and women ... [who] were catalogued as insurgents or criminal gang
members and killed by the armed forces."); Karl Penhaul, Colombian Military Fires 27 Soldiers
in Probe of Killings, CNN.com, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/
americas/1 0/29/colombiafirings/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (discussing the firing of
twenty-seven soldiers involved in the killing of eleven poor Bogota residents) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
224. See articles cited supra note 223 (reporting on Colombian military engaging in this
practice).
225. See, e.g., Aydm v. Turkey, 1997-VI Ear. Ct. H.R. 1866, 1891-92 (1997) (holding
rape of detainee to be torture under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights).
226. See Mark Benjamin, Will Psychologists Still Abet Torture?, SALON, Aug. 21, 2007.
http://www.salon.com./news/feature/2007f08/21I/psychologists/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2010)
(discussing resolution adopted by the American Psychological Association that condemned
certain interrogation practices, including mock executions, as torture) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); JUSTICE, Art 4. Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment: JUSTICE Commentary, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
http://www.eucharter.org/home.php?page id=78 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) ("Such actions as
mock executions, death threats, threats of rape, various humiliating acts and threats of reprisals
against a detainee's family may all constitute mental suffering for the purposes of Article 4.")
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
227. See supra Part IV.E (discussing mental stress).
228. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 213, art. 3(I)(a) (prohibiting mutilation of
detainees); Protocol I, supra note 222, art. 75(2)(a)(iv) (same).
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fingers. 2 While these examples are found outside of the military, if
fraternities or criminal organizations impose such requirements on their
members, then it certainly is foreseeable that military subgroups might also
voluntarily engage in such practices. Even if such practices are common within
the training structure of the detaining power, however, the proposed standard
would prohibit any mutilation or coercion that resulted in permanent
disfigurement.
D. Additional Benefits
1. Internal Checks on Behavior
The proposed definition does more than provide much needed clarity to
the torture question. 3 It also will greatly improve internal checks on behavior
or what might be termed ex ante self-enforcement. 3 Currently most soldiers,
in Western militaries at least, are aware that torture is illegal. 3 But they are no
more likely to have a clear and unshakeable understanding of what constitutes
severe pain and suffering than anyone else.23 So when they are ordered to
utilize coercive interrogation techniques they generally assume that those
techniques have been properly approved and that the techniques do not
constitute torture. 3 When Sergeant Javal Davis, sentenced to six months in
jail for his role in the Abu Ghraib abuses, was asked why he did not inform the
chain of command of the abuses, he said, "Because I assumed that if they were
doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have
said something. 2 35
229. See DAviD KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: JAPAN'S CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD 14
(2003) (describing the Japanese practice of yubitsume or "finger-shortening" used by the Yakuza
as both a punishment and a voluntary ritual of atonement); Tyra Black et al., Racism, Sexism,
andAggression: A Study of Black and White Fraternities, in AFRICAN AMERICAN FRATERNITEs
AND SoRoRrI FES: THE LEGACY AND) THE VISION 363, 380 (Tamara L. Brown et al. eds., 2005)
(discussing hazing in black fraternities, including use of branding).
230. See supra Part II (criticizing subjectivity and vagueness of current definitions of
torture).
231. See supra Part IV.F (discussing importance of effective self-enforcement in this area).
232. See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 13, at 314 (noting that American soldiers are
"extensively trained" in the Geneva Conventions).
233. See supra Part Il (noting lack of consensus on definition of severe pain and suffering).
234. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 251-52 (noting the "actual or perceived approval" by
superiors that makes it difficult for individuals to recognize the illegal nature of certain actions).
235. See Seymour Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42, 45,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa-fact (discussing
responsibility for abuses by U.S. military personnel at Abu Gbraib).
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Even if the soldiers are uneasy about these techniques, the hierarchical
structure of the military makes it very difficult to question their superiors about
the legality and morality of their orders .236 "Sir, isn't what you are telling me to
do torture?" is, in most circumstances, just too difficult a question to ask
because it directly challenges both the judgment and the morality of the
superior officer. On the other hand, if the standard for interrogation techniques
simply is "we will only do to others what we do to our own people" then the
question becomes much easier to ask: "Sir, do we really do this to our own
people?" The answer to that question is either a simple yes or no, and the
question is not one that directly attacks the judgment or morality of the
superior. As a result, it is a question that is likely to be asked much more
frequently, thereby bringing to light violations like those that occurred at Abu
Ghraib much sooner, or preventing them from occurring in the first place.
2. Bridging the "Expectation Gap"
Another benefit of the proposed standard is that it will bridge the gap that
currently exists between aspiration and reality in the interpretation and
enforcement of international law. Two statements illustrate this gap quite
clearly. The first was made by Dean John Hutson, a retired Navy Admiral, in
his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee during its consideration of
the nomination of Attorney General Mukasey.
One might think, "What a clever lawyer. He defined 'torture' so narrowly
and the defenses to torture so broadly that we can never be found guilty.
He has done a great service to the Nation." One would be dead wrong. We
have seen the consecluences of that sort of twisted legal analysis and we
must never repeat it.23
While Hutson may be right in decrying the "clever lawyer," his hollow
exhortation of "never again" is all too familiar in international law. Hutson
complains that the rule of law was not followed, 3 and yet at the very heart of
the matter is the fact that the definition of torture was vague enough that a
236. See id. (quoting Sergeant Davis as saying "I witnessed prisnrs... being made to do
various things that I would question morally.... We were told that they had different rules.').
237. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Michael B. Mukasey to Be Attorney
General of the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I110th Cong. 423
(2007) (statement of Dean John D. Hutson, RADM JAGC USN (ret.)) (calling for the next
Attorney General to ensure that the U.S. military complies scrupulously with the law).
238. See id. at 424 ("1 believe the Rule of Law has come off the rails in recent years.').
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"1clever lawyer" could entirely eviscerate it. Hutson's proposed solution is to
put the right people in place to get the rule of law "back on the tracks."
39
But who would those people be? How can we find people that will not see
something as acceptable when under great stress, only to later realize that it
was, in fact, monstrous? As California Attorney General, Earl Warren was
involved in the internment of hundreds of thousands of Japanese-Americans, a
decision he later regretted terribly.240 Likewise, in the current debate
concerning the use of waterboarding, legislators who later moved to prohibit
waterboarding in 2007 241 were briefed on the practice in 2002, and at that time,
none of them objected to the practice. 4 The Washington Post's discussion of
this change of heart was telling. It quoted an official who had been present at
initial briefings: "In fairness, the environment was different then because we
were closer to Sept. I11 and people were still in a panic."
2 43
Mentioning Warren and the congressional change of heart on
waterboarding is not done to criticize these actions, but rather to illustrate that
even individuals who might be expected to oppose the use of excessive
measures failed to do so under pressure. People panic when their nation is
attacked. That always will happen. And the people who are responsible for the
protection of their country will respond to that panic, and may even panic
themselves. Hutson hopes our leaders will be better than that in the future, and
that hope is widely shared. But history tells us that people from all kinds of
backgrounds generally are not "better" when they are under pressure, and if
broad subjectivity in the definition of torture is allowed to persist, there will
always be a "clever lawyer" on hand to inoculate those that are not "better"
from fuiture prosecution.
The second statement that illustrates the gap between aspiration and reality
was made by Michael Posner, President of Human Rights First, in response to
239. See id ("Our next Attorney General must work tirelessly and courageously to get [the
Rule of Law] back on the tracks.").
240. See CIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, TiHE MEMOIRs OF EARL WARREN 149 (1977) ("1 have
since deeply regretted the removal order and my own testimony advocating it.").
241. See Scott Shane, House Passes Restrictions on Interrogation Methods, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14,2007, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.comi/2007/12/14/World/americas/14iht-
cia.4.875 1421 .html?_r--l ("[Tlhe House of Representatives voted Thursday to prohibit
waterboarding and other harsh interrogation methods used by the CIA against high-level
prisoners from Al-Qaeda.").
242. See Joby Warrick & Dan Eggen, Hill Briefed on Waterboarding in 2002, WASHi. POST,
Dec. 9, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comi/wpdyn/contentl
article/2007/12/08/AR2007120801664.btmI (describing early briefing of key legislators on
waterboarding and other coercive interrogation techniques).
243. Id.
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the proposed standard advanced by this Article .2 "4 "No U.S. official should
engage in any conduct with respect to the treatment of detainees that we would
not expect for an American who is captured by our adversaries." 245 While
Posner made this statement in opposing the standard as too permissive of
coercion, his statement as written actually would allow for far more coercive
means than the standard proposed by this Article. This is because of the
difference between the words "expect" and "hope." If he sought to hold U.S.
officials to a higher standard, Posner should have stated that America's
treatment of detainees ought to be the same as the treatment we hope for a
captured American. The treatment that American servicemen receive in SERE
School, 4 which is where most of the techniques at issue in the current debate
about Guantanamo originated, is precisely what we expect Americans to face
when captured, and historically it has always been a mere shadow of what
actually awaits them.24
This should not be taken to imply that the proposed standard is based upon
linear reciprocity. It does not allow for the treatment that detainees receive to
vary based upon the treatment that the detaining state's own soldiers receive; a
detaining state is not allowed to mistreat detainees just because the other side
mistreats the detaining state's soldiers. The proposed standard would not have
excused many of the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib and Guantananmo even
though al-Qaeda quite dramatically beheaded a number of civilians that it
244. See Michael Lewis, Advice to the Next Administration Regarding Coercive
Interrogation, 30 A.B.A. NAT'L SECuiTrr L. REP'. 18, 18-19 (2008) (proposing the standard
suggested in this Article).
245. See Michael Posner & Michael W. Lewis, Advice to the Next Administration
Regarding Coercive Interrogation, ABA NAT'L SECuRITy L. REP., Sep/Oct 2008, at 18.
246. SERE School is run by the U.S. military for special forces and combat aviators (those
personnel at high risk of capture) to provide them with a small taste of what the rigors of
captivity will be like. See generally Jane Mayer, The Experiment, NEW YORKER, July 11, 2005,
at 60, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/11/050711Ifit -fact4 (discussing
SERE programs). My own experience at SERE School contributed greatly to my development
and advocacy of the standard proposed in this Article. Numerous articles and testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee have confirmed that some of the techniques used at
SERE School were reverse-engineered to be used during interrogations at Guantanamo Bay.
See id. (discussing the use of SERE techniques on detainees held by United States); see also
Hearing to Continue to Receive Testimony on the Origins of Aggressive Interrogation
Techniques. Hearing Before S. Comm. on A rmed Services: Part I of the Comm. 's Inquiry into
the Treatment of Detainees in US. Custody (P.M Session), I110th Cong. 2-44 (2008) (statement
of William J. Haynes, former Dept. of Def. Gen. Counsel) (responding to questions about
origins of SERE techniques in interrogations by U.S. officials).
247. See generally JEREMiAH- DENTON, JR., WHEN HELL WAS iN SESSiON (1982) (describing
torture and abuse suffered by author as a POW in Vietnam).
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captured. 4 What the proposed standard does do is provide a clear and realistic
guideline that does not rely on some hoped for good faith interpretation of




The most common objection to the proposed standard raised by the
panelists at the Oxford Roundtable, as well as by a number of other scholars
that have reviewed this proposal, has been that the equivalent physical
treatment of trainees and detainees does not mean that the overall experience is
the same. This is absolutely true. The mental anxiety of being in the hands of
your enemy cannot be replicated in a training environment, nor can the fear of
escalation that John Parry and others discuss in arriving at their expansive
definitions of torture .249 This criticism is bolstered by the fact that there also is
at least some evidence that the long-term psychological impact of physical
torture does not differ greatly from the long-term impact of psychological
stressors.25
If these objections are valid, then what value does the proposed standard
really have? First and foremost, it secures the physical integrity of the
prisoners. The amount of sleep deprivation, noise, exposure to temperature
changes, or the types of rough treatment will be identical in both kind and
duration for both groups. Because the physical impact of these techniques on
all people is variable, the captives also must receive the same medical
monitoring that trainees do to ensure the captives' physical safety.
248. See, e.g., Douglas Jehi, The Beheader: C.IA. Says Berg's Killer Was Very Probably
Zarqawi, N.Y TIMS, May 14, 2004, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/05/l4world/struggle-for-iraq-beheader-cia-says-berg-s-killer-was-very-probably-zarqawi.
html (reporting on beheading of American Nicholas Berg).
249. See supra Part IV.D (discussing control and escalation factors in defining torture).
250. See Mental Torture, supra note 74, at 283 ("[Plhysical torture did not contribute to
long-term psychological outcome over and above the effects of nonphysical stressors."). The
value of this study in the present context is somewhat limited because it included stressors such
as sleep deprivation, sham executions, death threats, rape threats, and watching the torture of
others as psychological rather than physical stressors. These techniques are considered torture
and forbidden, or in the case of sleep deprivation clearly limited, by the standard proposed by
this Article. Therefore, the implied equivalency between physical torture and psychological
stressors described by the Mental Torture study does not correlate with the mental versus
physical divide that exists in the standard proposed by this Article.
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But what about the mental aspects of captivity and interrogation? The
standard does little to account for the mental scars that long-term captivity and
interrogation can cause. That is due to the fact that International Humanitarian
Law allows for indefinite captivity and interrogation, particularly in the context
of nonintemnational armed conflicts .25'1 The only limitations placed on the
detention and interrogation of detainees in a noninternational armed conflict are
those found in Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11.252 These include
prohibitions against murder, mutilation, torture, cruel, humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, and enforced prostitution. 5 There can be no
question that the detaining power is allowed to ask questions of its detainees,
and few would argue against the use of noncoercive interrogation techniques
such as trickery or deception in order to extract valuable information from
enemy detainees. When it is considered that among the most psychologically
damaging things that can happen to a detainee is the realization that he has
provided information to the enemy, or that his comrades believe that he has
done so,254 it is difficult to conceptualize the limitation that can be placed on
the imposition of mental stress. It is a hard truth that captors in wartime cannot
be the guarantors of a detainee's mental health, and are in fact permitted to take
actions that are likely to cause psychological harm. The goal of the proposed
standard is to at least make the captors the guarantors, or close to it, of the
prisoner's physical health.
2. A Race to the Bottom
Objectors to the proposed standard also argue that it will lead to changes
in training standards that are designed to allow interrogators to "push the
envelope." Once interrogation standards are linked with training standards, so
the argument goes, states will implement harsher training standards in order to
justify harsher interrogations in the future. While this is theoretically possible,
it is practically very unlikely.
251. See Additional Protocol 11, supra note 58, art. 4 (setting standards of humane
treatment, but omitting any limits on length of imprisonment).
252. See id. (establishing "fundamental guarantees" for detainees).
253. See id. art. 4(2) (listing specific prohibited actions by detaining state).
254. Many Vietnam POWs have said that their lowest moments during captivity were not
after being physically tortured, but after giving up information. See Discussions with Doug
Hegdahl, former Vietnam POW; Dick Stratton, former Vietnam POW, Lecture (early 1 990s);
see also DENTON, supra note 247, at 44-83 (recounting episodes of torture and forced
confessions as a POW in North Vietnam).
130
A DARK DESCENT INTO REALITY11
Any new stressors would be applied to many more trainees than detainees,
so these new stressors would not be considered potentially harmful by the state
applying them. The only exception to this would be in states that truly do not care
about the well-being of their own people. While such states do exist, they are not
likely to be ones that are willing to be influenced by international law. It may be
possible to imagine North Korea creating a special unit of its own soldiers that are
horribly mistreated to justify its equally horrible mistreatment of prisoners. But
this presupposes that North Korea would require such a justification to commit
torture in the first place.
If the central premise of this Article is considered-that changing the
definition of torture only will change the behavior of states that are willing to be
bound by international law-then this criticism fails. Any state willing to go to
such lengths to justify torture is unlikely to be one that is willing to be bound by
international law in the first place.
3. The Proposal Undermines Reciprocity
Reciprocity is a cornerstone of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), 255
and it has been argued that the standard proposed by this Article undermines that
reciprocity 56 because the proposed standard allows for differing baselines for the
treatment of detainees based upon the internal regulations of each party to the
conflict. Where two warring nations, State A and State B, treat their own trainees
substantially differently, with State A treating its trainees much more harshly than
State B, the standard likewise would allow them to treat their detainees
substantially differently. As a result, it is possible that both parties could be
operating in full compliance with the proposed definition of torture advanced by
this Article, and yet the detainees of State A may be interrogated with far harsher
techniques than the detainees of State B. Put another way, under the proposed
standard, State B might be found guilty of having committed torture for treating
its detainees in exactly the same way that State A was treating its detainees, even
though the standard would find State A to be fully compliant.
While in this context the inequality of outcomes appears problematic, it is in
keeping with the current trend in LHL regarding "negative reciprocity."257
255. See Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARv. INT'L L.J. 365,366-68,
386-417 (2009) (providing a detailed discussion of the role and development of reciprocity in
IHL).
256. Debate with Jens Ohlin, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, in Ithaca, N.Y. (Apr.
13, 2009).
257. See Watts, supra note 255, at 386-418 (discussing the trend toward lim-iting negative
reciprocity). "Negative reciprocity" is a form of "observational reciprocity." See idat 375
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Negative reciprocity "refers to state suspensions of legal obligations in response to
breaches., 258 It would allow State B, as described above, to cease fulfilling its
legal obligations to State A in reaction to State A'Is failure to meet its parallel
obligations to State B. As lHL and human rights law converge in areas like the
CAT, there is a trend toward limiting State B's ability to suspend its obligations
merely because State A has breached its obligations to State B .259 This is because
the obligations of State B to treat its detainees in a certain manner are viewed as
being owed to State B's detainees rather than to State A. 260 So while this may
result in the inequality of outcomes discussed above, the alternative, which would
allow State B to treat its detainees worse in reaction to State A's conduct, greatly
undermines the protections that the CAT should provide, and would generally
result in those protections being limited to the handful of bright line prohibitions
discussed in Part IV.C.26 1
There is another, far more practical reason for tying the standard for
detainee treatment to the internal regulations of the detaining state, rather than
attempting to achieve reciprocal treatment between states. That is the absence
of a reliable flow of information during a conflict. When two states are in
conflict with one another, they are unlikely to share willingly, or openly reveal
to each other, what treatment standards are being maintained. 6 While neutral
third parties such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can
(explaining that under observational reciprocity, "states are bound by a treaty only to the extent
that other states observe the treaty's substantive provisions in practice"). This is similar to what
Derek Jinks terms "second-order reciprocity." See Derek Jinks, The Applica bility of the Geneva
Conventions to the "Global War on Terrorism, "46 VA. J. INT'L L. 165,193-95 (2005) (defining
second-order reciprocity as the idea that " [i] f states seek to promote the values embodied in the
Conventions, then they should reward treaty-regarding behavior and punish treaty-disregarding
behavior").
258. See Watts, supra note 255, at 376 (defining negative reciprocity).
259. See id. at 418 (describing rise of "multilateral treaties, stating broad, normative rules
of conduct applicable across the spectrum of states parties' international conduct"); see also
Jinks, supra note 257, at 193-95 (claiming that the Geneva Conventions do not contain a
requirement for "second-order reciprocity" that would allow for the suspension of obligations).
260. This Article does not attempt to unravel the complicated issue of individual
personality in international law. It is fair to say, however, that the concept of state obligations to
the individual, rather than merely to other states, is one that has received ever-increasing
amounts of support over the past half century. See. e.g., Watts, supra note 255, at 418 ("[A]
less sovereign-focused outlook on protections has emerged. It is not uncommon to bear states'
obligations under the law of war referred to as 'rights' that vest in individuals.").
261. See supra Part IV.C (discussing judicial decisions that "provide a general idea of the
line between permissible conduct and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment").
262. See, e.g., The War: Blowing the Whistle, TIME, Sept. 12, 1969, at 3 1, available at
http://www.timne.com/timielmagazine/article/0,9171,901396,00.hbl (reporting on revelations by
released POWs of poor treatment by the North Vietnamese).
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observe compliance with established standards of treatment, their neutrality and
access are based upon the fact that they cannot share this information with
outside sources.2 6 3 While it would be possible for the ICRC to confirm that
State A is adhering to its own internal standards, it would be impossible for it to
attempt to harmonize standards between the various parties to a conflict while
maintaining the confidentiality that allows it access in the first place.
4. What About Waterboarding?
In many ways, the discussion of waterboarding is a perfect microcosm of
the entire torture debate. It illustrates the subjectivity and indeterminacy that
undermines the current definition of torture, while also demonstrating how the
proposed standard advanced by this Article could evolve in practice.
The last four U.S. Attorneys General have very different opinions about
whether waterboarding constitutes torture. Within the past year, John Ashcroft
and Alberto Gonzales have maintained that waterboarding, as conducted by the
CIA in 2002, did not constitute torture,26 while Michael Mukasey has
consistently refused to state definitively whether waterboarding constituted
torture,265 and the current Attorney General, Eric Holder, definitively stated that
waterboarding was and is torture.266 Such wide disagreements between legal
professionals would not exist if torture were more clearly defined.
The waterboarding example also is valuable in demonstrating why the
current standard will adapt successfully to changes in customary international
law. If the waterboarding of Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad
was done in the manner described by both John Kiriakou and the Bradbury
memo,2 6 7 with a doctor present and for less than a minute, then according to the
263. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 246 (noting that International Committee of the Red
Cross was required to keep confidential the results of Guantanamo investigations).
264. See Interview by Dan Abrams with John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales, in L.A., Cal.
(Apr. 27, 2009), http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dft6kzgt_23gjhchbgk (last visited Feb. 22,
2010) (documenting Ashcroft's statement that waterboarding "was not torture" and agreement
by Gonzales) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
265. See Philip Shenon, So Is Waterboarding Torture? Mukasey May Never Say, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 26, 2008, at All, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/26/
washington/26justice.html ("'I didn't say I wouldn't answer it,' [Mukasey] said at a news
conference. 'I didn't say that I would."' (quoting former Attorney General Michael Muksasey)).
266. David Stout, Holder Tells Senators Waterboarding Is Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16holdercnd.html ("Eric H.
Holder Jr. said on Thursday that he believes unequivocally that 'waterboarding' is torture, and
that it must not be practiced by the United States regardless of the circumstances.").
267. See Kiriakou Interview, supra note 42, at 39 (describing waterboarding of Abu
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proposed standard, the limited use of the technique in 2002 would not have
been torture because of its routine use on American service members at the
time.26 However, it would no longer be permitted today. When America
completed the valuable public debate about the costs and benefits of
interrogation techniques, it concluded that waterboarding was not acceptable.
It discontinued the practice on trainees. Therefore, according to the proposed
standard, waterboarding would be considered torture if it were used today for
interrogations by the United States.
269
Two final aspects of waterboarding that appear to confirm its place on the
borderline between "torture" and "not torture," thereby making it a useful
technique to examine when considering where and how to place that line, are
that waterboarding largely is immune to the mental stress objection 270 and that
it has attracted a number of volunteers that have undergone the technique .27'1
The technique is immune from the mental stress objection-things are different
for trainees than for detainees-because the fear caused by waterboarding is
generated by the body's involuntary reaction to the sensation of drowning. The
body does not care if it is your best friend or most hated enemy that is drowning
you, it just reacts with a gag reflex and panic. 272 In addition to all the American
Zubaydah with a doctor present); see also Bradbury Memo, supra note 14, at 16 ("During the
use of the waterboard, a physician and a psychologist are present at all times.").
268. However, the Bradbury Memo indicates that these individuals were waterboarded
many times. See Bradbury Memo, supra note 14, at 17 ("[Tlhe waterboard has been used by the
CIA on three high level al-Qaeda detainees, two of whom were subjected to the technique
numerous times."). Because no American serviceman was subjected to such repeated exposure
to the technique, the proposed standard would have prohibited the repeated waterboarding of
Zubaydah and Mohanmmad in 2002. See id. at 16 ("The waterboard has been used many
thousands of times in SERE training provided to American military personnel, though in that
context it is usually limited to one or two applications of no more than 40 seconds each.").
269. See Christopher Hitchens, Believe Me, It's Torture, VANrry FAIR, Aug. 2008, at 70,
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/08hitchens208O8 ("Until
recently, 'waterboarding' was something that Americans did to other Americans.").
270. See supra part VL.E. 1 (discussing the different psychological effects of interrogation
practices on trainees versus detainees).
271. See, e.g., Hitchens, supra note 269, at 70-73 (describing the author's experience
being waterboarded at his own request); Kaj Larsen, A Lesson for Mukasey: Why I Had Myself
Water-Boarded, HuFFINOToN PosT, Oct. 31, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kaj-larson/a-
lesson-for-mukasey-why-_b_70651 .html (last visited Feb. 22, 20 10) (explaining why former
special forces officer, who had been waterboarded during SERF School, volunteered to be
waterboarded again for film crews in reaction to Mukasey's refusal to state that the procedure
was torture during his confirmation hearings) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
272. See., e.g., Kiriakou Interview, supra note 42, at 26 (explaining the choking and
gagging that waterboarding induces); Hitchens, supra note 269, at 71-72 (describing the
author's reaction to waterboarding). This also is based on the self-reporting of numerous U.S.
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service members that experienced the technique, a number of writers and
intelligence analysts also volunteered to undergo waterboarding, and they did
not report taking any comfort from the fact that they were being subjected to
waterboarding by "friends. 273 While most of the writers that have undergone
waterboarding have subsequently declared it to constitute torture, 7 there is a
seemingly fundamental contradiction between the ideas of volunteerism. and
275torture. It is this belief that volunteerism and torture are incompatible
concepts that, in part, undergirds the standard proposed by this Article.
VII. Conclusion
Few have accepted Levinson's invitation to descend into the muck and
confront the realities of warfare, terrorism, and interrogation because it is
difficult to address this subject seriously without feeling uneasy about the
realities being discussed. It remains far easier to sit back and say "John Yoo is
a monster," "the Landau Commission legalized torture," "the Diplock Courts
were a travesty," and "we should be better," and then avoid answering the
difficult questions of exactly how that is to be accomplished.*7 Accepting that
these criticisms are valid and that we should have been better does not change
things for the future. The only path to "being better" is to understand the
human realities associated with warfare, terrorism, and interrogation. Those
realities tell us people are not "better" when they are under siege. If the rule of
Navy colleagues of mine that were water boarded during SERE School.
273. See, e.g., Hitchens, supra note 269, at 70-73 (discussing author's voluntary
waterboarding); Larsen, supra note 271 (same).
274. See, e.g., Hitchens, supra note 269, at 72 ("[I]f waterboarding does not constitute
torture, then there is no such thing as torture.").
275. Although this Article is a reaction in opposition to the "I know it when I see it"
definition for torture, there is something viscerally at odds between the ideas of volunteerism
and torture. I am not aware of any volunteers willing to have their genitals connected to a car
battery, their torsos burned with blow torches, their arms pulled from their sockets, or their
fingernails ripped out to make a point about those practices that continue to be used in some
countries. While the mere fact that someone is willing to volunteer to undergo a coercive
technique does not, by itself, mean that the technique is not torture, it is a strong indication that
the label "torture" is being misapplied to the technique.
276. See Yoo, supra note 109, at 150 (noting that Jonathan Freiman, attorney for Jose
Padilla, after criticizing John Yoo, refused three times to say where he himself would "draw the
line" in defining torture). In a recent debate at Rutgers-Camden School of Law on this topic, the
audience asked my opponent, who clearly disagreed with the proposed standard, what
techniques he would find acceptable. See Debate at Rutgers-Camden College of Law, in
Camden, N.J. (Mar. 2009). Like Freiman, he evaded the question several times without
providing any specifics. Id.
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law has been repeatedly subverted by men, be they American, British, German,
or Israeli, then changing the men is not likely to provide a lasting solution to the
problem. What must be changed is the law, or at least how it is interpreted.
By proposing a specific solution, rather than dealing in the generalities
typically associated with this topic, this Article seeks to close the gap between
the idealized hope and the true realities of what happens when a nation is
attacked and its civilians are killed. It attempts to do this by proposing a
standard that might at least represent a starting place for a more serious
discussion of how changing a definition might help to change the way that
torture's prohibition is self-enforced, both ex ante and ex post. Within the
confines of the current international legal system, self-enforcement remains the
only effective tool for making the prohibition against torture a meaningful
reality. It is hoped that this proposed definition, that first and foremost seeks to
defend the physical integrity of detainees, provides a useful first step toward
improving that self-enforcement.
